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invitations to draw them, should be radically curtailed, not only because of the 
ambiguities and risks of prejudice that such inferences entail, but more 
importantly because they reflect and contribute to a confusion of roles in 
which the jury is enlisted to participate in the management of the pre-trial 
conduct of litigants with regard to evidence preservation, preparation, and 
selection. This management is properly the job of the judiciary, which has 
adequate tools for this purpose in the form of modernly available discove1y 
sanctions such as issue preclusion and separate monetary awards. The 
judicimy should be encouraged, if not required, to substitute these alternative 
tools for adverse inferences by juries. 
"[T]he law, in hatred of the spoiler, baffles the destroyer, and thwarts his 
iniquitous purpose, by indulging a presumption which supplies the lost 
proof, and thus defeats the wrong-doer by the very means he had so 
confidently employed to perpetuate the wrong. " 
-Pomeroy v. Benton1 
"[P]roofmust rest upon evidence and not upon its absence." 
- Stocker v. Boston & Maine Railroac£2 
INTRODUCTION 
A litigant's suppression, alteration, fabrication, or destruction of evidence 
poses a serious threat to the integrity of our system of adjudication. 3 The law 
clearly carmot afford to ignore such activity, and a critically important question 
is what to do about such activity when it is detected. A considerable literature 
has developed concerning this issue, as the problems of evidentiary misconduct 
have become more pressing.4 This Article addresses one piece of that puzzle, 
discussing one particular set of remedies for evidence suppression, destruction, 
and other forms of evidentiary misconduct: adverse inferences made by jurors 
in reaction to evidence of tampering, arguments made by counsel designed to 
elicit such inferences, and jury instructions designed to authorize or even 
encourage such inferences. For convenience, I will refer to this set of 
1 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882). 
2 151 A. 457, 459 (N.H. 1930). 
3 The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental 
and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were 
to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of 
the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all 
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
4 See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, 
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1989 & Supp. 2009); GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE 
FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (4th ed. 2008); MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., 
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE (Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2000). 
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responses simply as the "adverse inference" response, and I will differentiate 
among inferences, arguments, and instructions only when necessary, because 
most of what I have to say does not depend on whether such an inference is 
encouraged by an argument or sanctioned by a jury instruction. Analysis of 
the problems entailed by such inferences leads to the following conclusion: the 
use of adverse inferences should be radically curtailed in favor of simpler 
remedies that are imposed by the court without the involvement of the jury. 
The adverse inference response became entrenched in the common law at a 
time when very few tools of discovery were available.5 In such a system of 
litigation, there was little effective control over evidence tampering other than 
a party's ability to point to the misconduct at trial and ask the trier of fact to 
take it into account. 6 This response had, and continues to have, an obvious 
appeal, summarized in the following oft-quoted passage from Wigmore's 
famous treatise: 
It has always been understood - the inference, indeed, is one of the 
simplest in human experience - that a party's falsehood or other fraud in 
the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or 
suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct 
is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his 
case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be 
inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit. The 
inference thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, 
but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of 
alleged facts constituting his cause.7 
But our system of litigation has changed dramatically over the last century. 
Discovery and disclosure obligations are expansive under modem rules of civil 
and criminal procedure. 8 Furthermore, modem rules of evidence are generally 
more liberal in allowing the admission of relevant evidence.9 The question 
arises whether those changes warrant different responses to evidence 
tampering. I conclude that they do and that certain sanctions today associated 
with the regulation of discovery abuses should be the primary tools for 
responding to this kind of activity. This will require the clarification of the 
5 See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 201-28 (1952). 
6 See GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, § 1.3; Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting 
the Missing Witness Inference: Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 Mo. L. 
REv. 137, 138-43 (1985). 
7 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 278, at 133 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1979). 
8 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§ 7.1 (4th ed. 2005); 5 WAYNER. LAFAVEET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§§ 20.1-.2 (3d ed. 
2007). 
9 The relevant liberalizations will be noted infra Part I. 
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respective roles of the judge and the trier of fact (which, for convenience, I will 
hereafter refer to simply as "the jury"). 
There is no mistaking the fact that my proposal entails substantial change to 
prevailing litigation practices. Inevitably, many issues will need to be resolved 
if the law moves in the direction I suggest. I cannot here even attempt to 
answer all of the "But what about ... ?" questions that will arise. I will, 
however, explain enough to show that the proposal, though fairly radical, is 
both workable and beneficial. Indeed, it pushes a trend that is already 
underway. My argument will proceed in four stages. First, I will elaborate my 
thesis in greater detail, emphasizing where things stand and briefly explaining 
the direction of the change that should be made. Second, I will explain in 
general terms both the difficulties in using adverse inferences to address 
evidence tampering and the source of those difficulties. Third, I will 
demonstrate the comparative superiority of alternative remedies, especially the 
remedy of issue preclusion. Fourth, I will discuss prevailing attitudes in civil 
and criminal litigation, criticizing the reasons that modern courts and 
commentators have given for using adverse inferences to deal with evidence 
tampering. 
I. THE THESIS ELABORATED 
Courts use adverse inferences in both civil and criminal cases to respond to 
a variety of forms of evidentiary misconduct by a party, including: 
(1) violating a subpoena or discovery order requiring the patty to present 
or reveal unprivileged evidence to an opponent, or to submit to an 
inspection or examination of persons or things; 
(2) killing a witness, bribing or extorting a witness not to testify, or 
otherwise removing a witness, or secreting or destroying some tangible 
evidence subject to a duty of preservation and not subject to a valid claim 
of privilege; 
(3) suborning perjury, by threat or bribe, or tampering with or 
fabricating tangible evidence; or 
( 4) violating a duty to disclose to the opposition or present at trial 
unprivileged, admissible evidence within a party's control. 10 
There is no conventional name that covers all these diverse activities. For 
present purposes, they will be referred to collectively as "evidence 
tampering." 11 With respect to category (4), one might question whether there 
10 See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 7, §§ 278-80, at 285-91. 
11 This definition is intended to cover all forms of evidentiary misconduct during the 
course of litigation that have been subjected to the remedy of an adverse inference based on 
consciousness of a weak case. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DuKE 
L.J. 1215, 1218 n.4 (2004) (defining "evidence tampering" as covering "the full range of 
activities by which parties alter the natural evidentiary 'emissions' of the transactions and 
occurrences that may give rise to suit"). 
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is ever such a duty to disclose or present evidence, unless the evidence is 
covered by a valid subpoena or discovery order, in which case the matter 
would fall within category (1), or falls within the special duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence imposed on the state in criminal cases. 12 I have argued 
elsewhere, however, that the best interpretation of our prevailing litigation 
practices posits that litigants, other than the accused in criminal cases, have a 
qualified obligation of the kind in (4) when discovery mechanisms available to 
the opponent are ineffective. 13 Importantly, although the point is little noticed, 
the court may impose a case-specific obligation to present pa11icular evidence 
on a party with peculiar access to such evidence as part of the management of 
the burden of production.14 In any event, if and when such a duty is imposed, a 
party's failure to honor it is a form of evidence tampering. 
In some contexts, especially in categories (1) and (4), the evidentiary 
damage or deficiency is "reversible" in the sense that the tamperor can reverse 
course and make the evidence available to the opponent or to the court. In 
other contexts, the deficiency is practically irreversible. Throughout the 
following discussion, I assume that, unless the tampering is reversed, the 
opponent will suffer prejudice in the sense that there is reason to believe that 
tbe lost or missing information might well -have significant impact upon the 
case.15 Further, I assume that all available prelimina1·y steps- such as ordering 
disclosure or granting a continuance - have been taken to allow the opponent 
meaningful access to suppressed evidence, but to no avail. 16 
Under current practice, a party commonly argues to the jury that the 
opponent's act of tampering should be the basis for an adverse inference 
against that party. For example, a party may argue that the opponent's 
destruction of evidence shows that the lost evidence would have been 
unfavorable to the opponent and that the act of destruction reveals a guilty 
conscience. The argument might or might not be supported by a jury 
instruction. A typical instruction reads as follows: 
12 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963) (holding that when the prosecutor 
suppresses "evidence favorable to the accused upon request" he violates the accused's due 
process rights where the evidence is material to guilt or innocence). 
13 Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REv. 227, 233-34 (1988). 
14 See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS 
L.J. 621, 640-43 (1998). As explained below, so-called "missing evidence" or "missing 
witness" inferences usually make sense only when the court is willing to impose such an 
obligation. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. 
15 See KOESEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 34-35. 
16 For example, when lost information can be retrieved by the expenditure of resources, a 
common remedy courts employ in civil cases is to require the tamperor to bear the costs of 
reconstructing the lost evidence. See, e.g., Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 553-
54 (D. Minn. 1989). The assumption here is that such steps are either unavailable or 
insufficient to eliminate the prejudice to the opponent or to achieve the law's goal of 
deterring evidence tampering. 
1094 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1089 
If you should fmd that a party willfully [suppressed] [hid] [destroyed] 
evidence in order to prevent its being presented in this trial, you may 
consider such [suppression] [hiding] [destruction] in determining what 
inferences to draw from the evidence or facts in the caseP 
Some commonly used jury instructions more directly state the inference to be 
drawn from the party's conduct: 
If a party fails to produce evidence that is under that party's control and 
reasonably available to that party and not reasonably available to the 
adverse party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable to the 
party who could have produced it and did not. 1B 
Such an instruction specifically authorizes the jury to infer that the evidence 
not presented would, if presented, be adverse to the party in control thereof. 
But it is important to notice that the instruction does not preclude a broader 
inference of the kind described by Wigmore in the Introduction to this Article, 
indicating a party's consciousness of guilt, liability, or groundlessness of the 
claim as a whole. 19 Of course, in a case where evidence. is not lost but is 
instead fabricated, there can be no inference to the content of the lost evidence, 
and the only inference of importance, aside from the inference that the 
fabricated evidence is useless, is the more general one endorsed by Wigmore. 
To be sure, some judicial opinions and several commentators have made 
fairly critical assessments of the use of adverse inferences.2° Courts have 
expressed the most serious skepticism about the use of an adverse inference 
when the inference is to be drawn from the failure of a party to present 
available evidence at trial. This skepticism typically arises in cases, civil and 
criminal, where extant potential evidence is practically accessible by both 
parties. Nonetheless, the resulting rule is sometimes expressed more broadly, 
denying all "missing witness" inferences (or only missing witness jury 
instructions) in criminal (or civil) cases.21 In the context of a modem legal 
17 3 KEVIN O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 104.27 (5th ed. 2000); see also id. § 105.10 (authorizing inference against 
party when a witness refuses to answer a proper question at trial). 
18 !d. § 104.26; see also id. § 104.25 (authorizing an inference against a party for not 
calling a witness reasonably available to that party and not equally available to the opponent 
-a typical "missing witness" instruction). 
19 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
20 See, e.g., GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, § 3.2; 2 McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE§§ 264-65 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE§ 5178 (1978); 
Stier, supra note 6, at 145-56. To be sure, some commentators are more favorably disposed 
to the use of adverse inferences. See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary 
Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963-65 (1997). 
21 See, e.g., Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 911 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(proposing in dicta the rejection of missing witness inferences in federal civil trials); State v. 
Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 447-52 (Conn. 1999) (discussing the statutory abolition of missing 
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system- with extensive pre-trial disclosure and discovery mechanisms, no rule 
requiring parties to vouch for the credibility of their witnesses,22 and the option 
of asking the trial judge to call a dubious witness23 - this trend is not 
surpnsmg. And it is generally wholesome: as emphasized in the opinions 
manifesting this trend, the party who would otherwise request the adverse 
inference can, instead, simply call a witness whose testimony is expected to be 
adverse to the opponent, or else request that the court call the witness.24 The 
witness instructions in civil trials, abandoning such instructions in criminal trials, and 
discouraging prosecutorial arguments inviting an adverse inference against the accused); 
State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 776-77 (Me. 1985) (abandoning missing witness inferences 
in criminal trials); State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 199-200 (Minn. 1974) (disallowing 
missing witness inferences against the accused); Henderson v. State, 367 So. 2d 1366, 1368 
(Miss. 1979) (disallowing jury instructions authorizing an adverse inference from either 
party's failure to call a witness in criminal cases); Ross v. State, 803 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 
(Nev. 1990) (disallowing missing witness inferences against the accused); State v. Jefferson, 
353 A.2d 190, 197-99 (R.I. 1976) (prohibiting a prosecutor's comments suggesting a 
missing witness inference); State v. Hammond, 242 S.E.2d 411, 416 (S.C. 1978) 
(concluding that missing witness instructions are improper in civil and criminal trials, but 
recognizing that comment by counsel may be permitted); State v. Tahair, 772 A.2d 1079, 
1086 (Vt. 2001) (disallowing missing witness instructions in criminal trials, but reserving 
question of whether counsel may invite the jury to draw an adverse inference); Russell v. 
Commonwealth, 223 S.E.2d 877, 879 (Va. 1976) (disallowing for criminal trials, but not 
civil trials, the use of missing witness instructions that state a presumption, but 
distinguishing permissive inferences). 
22 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 607 advisory committee's note (rejecting the common-law rule 
that barred a party from impeaching its own witness). 
23 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 614 (authorizing the trial judge to call and interrogate a witness 
at the request of a party and permitting all parties to cross-examine such a witness). 
24 Some courts have misunderstood the relevance of the abolition of the voucher rule, 
thinking that it relates to the party against whom the inference is suggested. See, e.g., Twin 
Island Dev. Corp. v. Winchester, 512 A.2d 319, 326 (Me. 1986) (distinguishing, 
supposedly, Brewer and approving an adverse inference against the defendant in a civil case 
on account of the defendant's failure to testify, commenting cryptically that an inference is 
appropriate despite the fact that the "[d]efendant need not vouch for her witnesses"). 
Rather, the abolition of the voucher rule speaks to the options of the party inviting the 
inference: without a voucher rule, that party need not fear calling a witness, even a reluctant 
or hostile one, who might testify in a manner inconsistent with the witness's pre-trial 
commitments, in depositions or otherwise, because impeachment is always an option. See 
Malave, 737 A.2d at 448-49; State v. Whitman, 429 A.2d 203, 208-09 (Me. 1981) (Roberts, 
J., concurring) (anticipating Brewer's rejection of adverse inferences). Similarly, a party 
who thinks that a missing witness might testify favorably for that party, but who does not 
want to be associated with the witness's unsavory character, has the option of requesting the 
court to call the witness, in which case the party may cross-examine and impeach the 
witness if necessary. See FED. R. EVID. 614(a). Moreover, in many circumstances, the pre-
trial statements of a testifying witness are even admissible "substantively," that is, to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted before trial, notwithstanding the hearsay rule. See FED. R. 
Evm. 80l(d)(l). And, of course, a party does not even need to call a party-opponent as a 
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failure to do so undermines the argument for the adverse inference in the same 
way that the opponent's failure to call the witness suggests such an inference in 
the first place. Moreover, such failure - by both parties - creates entirely 
unnecessary ambiguity and uncertainty: calling the witness is the better 
alternative. 
My proposal would eliminate adverse inferences, and thus the admissibility 
of evidence to support them, in the cases described above and a great many 
other situations. Indeed, I claim that the only context in which courts ought to 
allow adverse inferences arising from evidentiary misconduct- at least within 
the scope of what I have called evidence tampering - is when the inferences 
are employed against the accused in criminal trials, and then only in certain 
contexts.25 This sole exception will seem odd to many: why would we employ 
a certain remedy only against the accused? Don't we usually want to accord 
the accused a favored position, and immunize him from remedies, like directed 
verdicts, that may be used against the prosecution or against civil parties? 
Such a reaction, however, mistakes my position. I argue that, as to all 
parties other than the criminally accused, the remedy for intentional evidence 
tampering should be issue preclusion, which is generally at least as severe as 
an adverse inference. By issue preclusion, I mean the court's summary 
determination, against the tamperor, of ultimate or intermediate factual issues 
as to which the lost evidence significantly pertains. This preclusion might or 
might not lead to summary disposition of the case without trial. 26 
The moral intuition here is simple to state. A party to litigation has a right 
to a determination on the merits only if that party follows the rules of litigation. 
These rules prohibit a party's tampering with potentially significant evidence. 
witness in order to admit her pre-trial statements. See FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(2) advisory 
committee's note. 
25 Similar arguments would warrant the elimination of adverse inferences in the context 
of litigative misconduct not falling within the scope of evidence tampering as here defined, 
at least when committed by a party other than a criminal defendant. For example, a party's 
attempt to bribe the jury leads to similar inferences and problems. See McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 265, at 226-27 & n.ll. But the present argument is focused on 
misconduct that distorts the evidence presented at trial. 
26 Preclusion might remove one element of the plaintiffs case (in favor of the plaintiff) 
but leave the other elements to be tried, or it might defeat only an affirmative defense, 
leaving triable the plaintiffs entire case-in-chief. Further, tampering might impact evidence 
relating to only one intermediate fact, F, that in tum is relevant to an ultimate fact, U, in 
such a way that, although an increase (or decrease) in the probability of F increases (or 
decreases) the probability of U, F being certainly true (or false) does not render U certainly 
true (or false), because the probability of U depends as well on other intermediate facts. 
Issue preclusion can, therefore, operate only on the intermediate fact, F, leaving the trier of 
fact free to accept or reject the ultimate fact, U. In that event, issue preclusion then would 
not entail a summary judgment or dismissal/default on any claim or defense; in a jury trial, 
it would entail an instruction to the jury that, in deciding whether the burden of persuasion 
relating to U has been satisfied, the jury should take F to be true (or false). 
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A party who engages in such acts forfeits that right and should lose its case, or 
at least as much of it as the tampering affects. 27 This intuition is given 
expression, if somewhat hyperbolically, in the statement by the Missouri 
Supreme Court in Pomeroy, quoted at the beginning of this Article.28 At the 
same time, by removing the jury from the administration of the problem, cases 
that go to trial can do so on the basis of the evidence that is presented; the jury 
need not worry about the absence of evidence arising from a party's 
misconduct in litigating the case. Thus, the core idea expressed by the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court in Stocker is also respected.29 Although issue 
preclusion may serve to deter evidence tampering, and is certainly intended to 
do so, it is not so much a punishment as. it is an effort to protect the integrity of 
the adjudicative system by refusing to submit cases to the jury when they have 
been inappropriately prepared. 
Three important qualifications should be noted up front. First, issue 
preclusion should not apply to a judicial finding that a party has lied about the 
events being litigated, for to do so would obviate the very purpose of the trial. 
Assessing the credibility of witnesses at trial, with or without the assistance of 
experts, is a quintessential function of the trier of fact, and jurors are routinely 
told as much. 3° Furthermore, the use of prior inconsistent statements, 
including those of a party, is too much a part of an assessment of credibility to 
allow courts to preempt a detennination on the merits based on the trial comt' s 
judgment that a party lied in a pre-trial statement - even one under oath.31 
Subornation of perjury, however, is another matter entirely, as is perjury 
regarding the existence or location of other evidence of the litigated events. 
A related qualification concerns cases in which the substantive right 
supporting a claim allegedly arises from a verbal act constituted by a document 
or other tangible thing, the authenticity of which is denied by an opponent.32 A 
simple example is a breach of written contract case in which the defendant 
claims that the writing is a fake. In such a case, the substantive issue is 
identical to the issue of evidence tampering, and assigning resolution of the 
27 See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984) 
(holding that the plaintiffs' intentional destruction of documents "eliminated plaintiffs' right 
to have their cases decided on the merits"). 
28 Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882). 
29 Stocker v. Boston & Me. R.R., 151 A 457, 459 (N.H. 1930). 
30 See, e.g., 3 O'MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 17, § 105.01 (instructing jurors that 
they "are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony 
deserves"). 
31 See, e.g., People v. Beyah, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 834 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming, 
despite the trial court's use of a dubious "consciousness of guilt" instruction, a conviction 
obtained after the prosecution impeached the accused with alleged inconsistencies from his 
testimony at a pre-trial suppression hearing). 
32 The concept of a "verbal act" is familiar from the law of hearsay: a verbal act is an 
utterance that changes the parties' legal relationship by creating an obligation or right. See 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 249, at 133-34. 
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dispute to the court would deprive the jury of its authority to decide the core 
contested issue between the parties. More importantly, the resolution of the 
issue does not involve the kind of inference process that Wigmore described, 
because there is no need for the jury to go beyond the inference that the 
document is a fake to the more general proposition that its proponent is 
conscious of wrongdoing. Once it is decided that the document is a fake, the 
inference process is over and the case may be decided.33 The criticisms of 
conventional adverse inferences developed in the following Part will clarify 
the importance of this limited inference process. 
The third qualification is peculiar to criminal cases. The accused (but not 
the prosecution) should be immune from issue preclusion for the same reason 
that we prohibit directed verdicts in favor of the prosecution: to protect both 
the accused's right to a jury triaP4 and the accused's right not to be convicted 
unless the prosecution establishes every essential element of the alleged 
offense beyond reasonable doubt.35 The constitutional status of these rights 
argues against the idea that an accused can forfeit them by tampering with the 
evidence, as reprehensible as such conduct may be. 36 In the absence of issue 
preclusion, the adverse inference is the only viable solution for evidence 
tampering by the accused in many contexts_37 This point is developed further 
hereafter. 38 
33 Quite different is a case in which the documents presented at trial are intended merely 
to represent the documents upon which the substantive right is based. See, e.g., Seiler v. 
Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary judgment for 
the defendant based on the trial court's exclusion of secondary evidence of drawings upon 
which the claim was founded because the plaintiff lost or destroyed the originals in bad 
faith). In Seiler, the trial court found that the plaintiff had suppressed evidence of the 
original drawings. As will be argued below, issue preclusion is a more direct and honest 
remedy than excluding the plaintiff's principal evidence and then granting summary 
judgment. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. 
34 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (holding that a 
verdict may not be directed against the accused regardless of the strength of the evidence). 
35 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt 
as to every element of the prosecution's affirmative case). 
36 Losing the right to a determination on the merits is quite different, and obviously much 
more serious, than, for example, merely losing the right to exclude hearsay on Confrontation 
Clause grounds, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (holding that fmfeiture of 
the right to confront an unavailable witness requires a showing that the accused acted with 
the purpose of suppressing testimony from the witness), or even losing the right to present a 
defense witness, Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (affirming exclusion of a 
witness that the defense had not listed in advance, as required under state law, where the 
omission was motivated by a desire to gain a tactical advantage). 
37 This assumes, of course, that such an inference is not claimed to arise from the 
exercise of a valid privilege, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, which raises 
quite distinct issues. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 513 advisory committee's note, reprinted 
in 56 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1972); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 264, at 224. 
38 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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II. THE DIFFICULTIES WITH ADVERSE INFERENCES 
As illustrated in the previous Part, there is no single inferential pattern that 
can be identified as quintessential in the great variety of cases involving 
evidence tampering that have occasioned adverse inferences. Still, there are a 
number of useful paradigms. Consider a simple case: a plaintiff sues in tort for 
damages caused by a defective product. In the context of a motion to enforce 
discovery, the trial judge determines that the plaintiff intentionally destroyed 
the allegedly defective product for the purpose of preventing its examination 
by the defense - a clear case of "bad faith" destruction. This destruction is 
irreversible. No reasonable expenditure of money and effort can recreate the 
product or the information that would be specially obtainable by inspection of 
the product, with one exception: the plaintiff is prepared to testify about the 
defective operation of the product that led to his injury. 
Under standard rules of procedure, the trial judge may simply enter an order 
to the effect that the product must be taken not to have been defective. This is 
the remedy of issue preclusion.39 An alternative remedy is to permit an 
adverse inference: the defendant argues to the jury, with or without the support 
of a jury instruction, that the jury should draw an inference against the plaintiff 
from the fact of destruction.40 One can identify reasons that a judge might 
have for rejecting the issue preclusion remedy and selecting instead the option 
of allowing an adverse inference. I will return later to what those reasons 
might be.41 For now, I want to ask the following question: if an adverse 
inference is invited, what is a juror to do? 
A. Probative Value and Prejudicial Potential 
Suppose that, without regard to the information about destruction and the 
argument for an adverse inference, based solely on the plaintiff's testimony 
about the injury and the defense's evidence about the possibility of the injury 
39 See FED. R. CN. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). Functionally equivalent in this context is an order 
striking the pleading of the tamperor. See id. 37(b)(2)(A)(iii). However articulated, these 
sanctions will entail a preemptive termination of the litigation. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 594-95 (4th Cir. 2001); DiDominico v. C&S Aeromatik 
Supplies, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 452, 459-60 (App. Div. 1998). To be sure, the latter procedure 
preserves the theoretical possibility that the plaintiff may refile within the limitations period 
should the allegedly defective product (perhaps miraculously) reappear and, thus, be 
available for inspection by the defendant. 
40 See, e.g., Beil v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting a summary judgment in favor of an adverse inference on account of the plaintiffs 
agent's destruction of the instrumentality of harm); Rodriguez v. Webb, 680 A.2d 604, 607 
(N.H. 1996) (affirming the use of an adverse inference against the defendant for the 
defendant's fraudulent destruction of the instrumentality of the plaintiffs injury). 
41 See infra Part IV.A.l. Another remedy commonly encountered in such cases is to 
exclude the testimony offered by the tamperor about the allegedly defective operation or 
condition of the product. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B). The advantages and 
disadvantages of this remedy are discussed infra at notes 81-89 and accompanying text. 
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occurring as plaintiff claims, our juror estimates the odds that the product was 
defective at about 2:1, a probability of defect of about 67%. Now consider 
how the situation is changed once the juror learns of the evidence destruction 
and hears the defense argument and any supporting jury instruction. How is 
the juror to react to this new information? 
The juror can, of course, reason that the plaintiff must have been trying to 
hide something. But what exactly does that involve? The jury is charged to 
decide whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the product was defective. 
For simplicity, let us assume that no other issues in the case exist, and that we 
can model this as a determination of whether the probability of defect is greater 
than 50%.42 A juror certainly can react to this new information by reducing the 
probability of defect. But by how much? No matter how the juror approaches 
the problem, she cannot avoid a stark dilemma: she can only very roughly 
assess - one is right to say "speculate" about - the potential impact of the lost 
information.43 Decidedly, this process must be episternically inferior to the 
opportunity to consider the lost information. In any event, the assessment will 
matter to the outcome of the case for this juror only if the adverse inference is 
strong enough to reduce the probability of defect to 50% or less. 
To be sure, there is another piece of information available to the jury; 
namely, that the plaintiff is the kind of person who is willing to engage in 
evidence tampering. This may well be the real source of the "indefinite" but 
"strong" inference to which Wigmore referred.44 But what kind of inference is 
that? Is it simply the inference that the tamperor is a bad person, or at least the 
kind of person who would do bad things, from which the jury is to infer an 
increased likelihood that the plaintiff is lying about the product's defect or that 
the claim is otherwise fabricated? If so, the inference would violate the 
character evidence rule, which prohibits an inference from a character trait to 
42 Nothing in what follows hinges on this explicit quantification of the burden of 
persuasion; it is used merely for expository clarity. Of course, the difficulties involved in 
such quantification have been discussed at length elsewhere. For a useful point of entry into 
the debate, see D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision 
Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT'L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (1999). For a discussion of 
recent work on the subject, see Mike Redmayne, Exploring the Proof Paradoxes, 14 LEGAL 
THEORY 281 (2008). 
43 Occasionally, a court will try to maintain that the inference does not (and should not) 
involve speculation. See, e.g., Felice v. Long Island R.R., 426 F.2d 192, 195 n.2 (2d Cir. 
1970) (opining that the jury should not speculate about the content of a missing witness's 
testimony, but rather should be allowed "to give the strongest weight to the evidence already 
in the case in favor of the other side, and which has not been, but might have been, 
effectively contradicted or explained by the absent witness" (citing Seligson, Morris & 
Neuburger v. Fairbanks Whitney Corp., 257 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (App. Div. 1965))). But the 
jury is not, of course, required to give this "strongest" weight, and the court does not explain 
how the jury is to decide to what extent it will give other evidence the "strongest weight" 
without speculating about the potential testimony of the missing witness. 
44 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
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action in conformity therewith.45 The conventional answer is that evidence of 
tampering need not violate the character evidence prohibition, because such 
evidence is (at least minimally) relevant to consciousness of the adverse nature 
of the evidence or of liability on the claim as a whole.46 Even if the juror can 
avoid the improper propensity inference, however, there remains the problem 
of determining just how strong this independent inference by way of 
"knowledge" should be. 
A plausible assumption is that many, if not most, jurors will answer the 
question posed to them not by reference to what they think about effects on the 
probability of defect, at least in part because of the difficulty just noted in 
assessing this directly, but rather by reference to the immorality of plaintiff's 
behavior in destroying the evidence. If a juror views the plaintiff's behavior as 
really awful, she will reduce the probability of defect by enough to insure that 
it is less than 50% and prefer a verdict for the defense. Conversely, if she 
believes that his behavior was not bad enough to warrant the plaintiff losing, 
she will leave the probability essentially where it was, at 67%, and prefer a 
verdict for the plaintiff. That is, the choice of verdict determines the 
probability assessment, rather than the other way around. What the juror is 
really doing in such a case is deciding whether the litigative conduct of the 
plaintiff warrants increasing the burden of persuasion to the point where, 
contrary to her initial inclination, the plaintiff will lose. It is an ali-or-nothing 
choice, based on considerations largely, if not entirely, ancillary to the primary 
dispute. 
There is, at this time, no empirical evidence clearly supporting this 
particular hypothesis, although evidence of "other bad acts" - that is, acts 
distinct from the act alleged in the litigation - have long been thought to have a 
powerful effect on the verdict, even in the face of limiting instructions that 
would seem to preclude such an effect.47 But there is at least some 
longstanding authority on the more specific question at issue here. Revisions 
45 See FED. R. Evrn. 404(b). 
46 !d. (evidence of other wrongs is not excluded by the rule if offered for other purposes 
such as to prove "knowledge"); see also Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29-32 
(Ky. 1998) (affirming conviction despite the prosecution's introduction of evidence that the 
defendant had suborned perjury by an alibi witness who was used to obtain a new trial but 
was not presented at the second trial). Of course, its relevance in this manner does not 
obviate the need to balance probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice or misleading 
the jury. See FED. R. EVID. 403. There are cases excluding evidence of tampering on such 
grounds. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 265 n.17, at 228. 
47 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 158-62 (1966) 
(reporting data showing the importance that both juries and judges attach to evidence of a 
prior criminal record); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting 
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37-47 (1985) (reporting and discussing experimental results showing that 
limiting instructions could not effectively confine the jurors to using the prior criminal 
record of the accused solely for impeachment purposes). 
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of McCormick's treatise put the matter quite succinctly when discussing the 
admissibility of the evidence of tampering: 
A question may well be raised whether the relatively modest probative 
value of this species of evidence is not often outweighed by its prejudicial 
aspects. The litigant who would not like to have a stronger case must 
indeed be a rarity. It may well be that the real underpinning of the rule of 
admissibility is a desire to impose swift punishment, with a certain poetic 
justice, rather than concern over the niceties of proof.48 
This brief passage makes several related points. First, evidence tampering may 
well be done by individuals who, if the truth could be known, would be 
entitled to a favorable judgment. There are many reasons that people try to 
game the system, and some of those reasons are entirely consistent with being 
in the right on the merits. For example, a person who truly deserves to win 
may well believe, sometimes with good reason, that the available evidence (or 
even "the system") is stacked against him and that he can only win if he is 
willing to cut some ]JfOce.dural corners.49 Thus, the inference from the 
tampering behavior is at least ambiguous, making it difficult for the juror to 
adjust probabilities sensibly. Second, evidence about one's litigative behavior 
constitutes "other bad acts" evidence, which raises the kinds of concerns 
around which the rules of character evidence are constructed, inviting the juror 
to reason that someone who suppresses evidence is more likely to be the kind 
of person who would be wrong on the merits. Finally - and this is the 
psychological hypothesis - the juror who accepts the adverse inference 
argument may well be imposing "poetic" justice, meaning a kind of justice that 
does not implement what the above passage somewhat cryptically calls "the 
niceties of proof." This poetic justice is achieved by adjusting the burden of 
persuasion to the detriment of thy tamperor. 50 
To be sure, there are those who question the entire enterprise of precluding 
character evidence. Some would argue that trials are almost always about 
character, and that effective limitations on arguments from character evidence 
are the exception rather than the rule.51 Be that as it may, the character 
48 2 McCORiviiCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 265, at 228. This particular paragraph 
was not contained in the original treatise; it first appeared in the second edition, prepared 
after McCormick's death. See McCORJviiCK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 273, 
at 661 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972). 
49 See, e.g., McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 921-23 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(admitting evidence of plaintiff's fabrication of evidence, by subornation of perjury, in 
context where plaintiff's efforts to discover potentially corroborating witnesses known to 
the defense may well have been stonewalled during discovery). 
50 See Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MlCH. L. REv. 1021, 1038-39 
(1977). 
51 Scholars have long wrestled with this phenomenon. An insightful series of articles 
appeared in a 1998 symposium. See generally Symposium, Truth & Its Rivals: Evidence 
Rejonn and the Goals of Evidence Law, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289 (1998). 
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evidence rules are still with us. There is, moreover, something distinctive 
about the risk of prejudice in this context, something that makes evidence 
tampering quite different from other kinds of "bad acts" evidence. In the usual 
context of "bad acts" evidence, the actor's alleged delict breaches a duty owed 
to some private person, not an official of the court. Evidence tampering is 
different in that it constitutes an attack upon the court itself, a breach of duty to 
the tribunal and, most especially, to the jury, whose task it is to reconstruct past 
events as well as it possibly can. By damaging the evidence that is available to 
the jury, the tamperor impedes that task, and one can well expect the jury to 
react to such an affront. The risk of prejudice is real, even if we are inclined to 
call it "poetic justice." 
B. A Confusion of Juridical Roles 
The foregoing difficulties are symptomatic of a deep confusion, one that has 
gone largely unnoticed. Whether within the law or in other contexts, any 
situation that calls for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty poses 
two distinct problems. Here, I will call them the "evidence search problem" 
and the "final decision problem."52 First, a decision-malcer must decide when 
she has acquired enough evidence to make the final decision, and, when that 
has happened, she must make that final decision under the conditions of 
uncertainty that remain. Both of these problems pose what are essentially 
problems of practical optimization. 53 In the search context, a bit crudely put, 
one obtains evidence until the cost of acquisition exceeds the anticipated 
benefits of the search effort. In the final decision context, also crudely put, one 
52 This distinction tracks another: the distinction between two senses of evidentiary 
"weight." See Dale A. Nance, The Weights of Evidence, 5 EPISTEME 267, 267-69 (2008) 
(distinguishing between weight in the sense of the degree of completeness Qf the evidence 
and weight in the sense of the degree to which the available evidence favors one side or the 
other). 
53 Nothing in the argument presented here depends heavily on this characterization, but 
to avoid confusion, I should say something about my use of the term "practical 
optimization." First, it is used to differentiate these decisions from decisio'ns that are 
indifferent to, or at least not dominated by, costs and benefits, such as decisions controlled 
by deontological norms (such as the rejection of torture). Second, it is normative: I do not 
mean to suggest that an accurate psychological description of the decision process for any 
given legal actor involves what decision theorists refer to as "unbounded rationality" 
(involving infinite calculation resources) or even "optimization under constraints," though 
they may for various purposes be usefully modeled as if they do. For example, such 
decision processes may involve what is called "satisficing" by the use of "heuristics." See 
GERD G!GERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS 
THAT MAKE Us SMART 5-15 (1999). What matters is that such devices contribute to 
achieving a balance of benefits and costs that is no worse than can be obtained under any 
practically identifiable and available alternative, within any deontological constraints that 
may apply. 
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chooses so as to minimize the expected costs of errors, given the remaining 
uncertainty. 54 
When the investigator and the decision-maker are the same person, these 
two problems may not be conspicuously separated. Legal adjudication, 
however, generally does separate these two problems and assign them to 
different actors in the legal system.55 In an adversary system, the search 
problem is primarily handled by the parties, acting under obvious incentives, 
but qualified and supervised by the judiciary applying various rules of 
discovery, admissibility, and sufficiency.56 In contrast, the final decision 
problem is assigned to the jury (or to a judge in a bench trial) under proof rules 
established beforehand and supervised by the trial judge. If the system works 
as it is intended to, the judiciary and the rules it administers will ensure that 
parties present to the jury a set of information that is optimized with respect to 
the search problem. That is, they will present all the practically useful and 
admissible information that is reasonably available to be presented. This will 
not, of course, eliminate all uncertainty, and the jury, then, must make the final 
decision under conditions of (not-reasonably-avoidable) uncertainty. Because 
any residual uncertainty is not reasonably avoidable, the jury need not consider 
questions of responsibility for sub-optimality in the solution to the search 
problem. 
With this in mind, the central problem of adverse inferences comes into 
relief: they involve a confusion of roles. The jury is being assigned 
management of an issue that properly lies in the context of the search problem. 
When a plliiy suppresses practically useful evidence, the resolution of the 
search problem has been rendered sub-optimal. That is a kind of problem that 
typically is, and should be, addressed by the judiciary, not by juries.57 Many of 
the remedies, including issue preclusion, available to a trial judge in cases of 
discovery abuse illustrate how this can be done. To the extent that my 
behavioral hypothesis is true, when the problem is assigned to the jury instead, 
54 See John Kaplan, Decision The01y and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
1065, 1071-77 (1968). A more complete understanding takes into account the varying 
utilities of true positives and true negatives. See Nance, supra note 14, at 623. 
55 Cf H.L. Ho, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW 167-68 (2008) (opining that in both 
contexts, "[t]he intertwining of epistemic and ethical considerations here is complex and it is 
unclear that they are separable"). 
56 In Continental systems of adjudication, the parties have a reduced role in handling the 
search problem, but the final decision problem can still be separated from the evidence 
search problem by assigning responsibility for the two tasks to different magistrates. Even a 
single judge handling the entire case wears two distinct hats: the investigator and the 
decider. See John H. Langbein, The Gennan Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 823, 826-32 (1985) (describing how the judge proceeds with investigation until the 
point is reached that a decision can be made). 
57 See Nance, supra note 14, at 633-39 (identifying particular situations of sub-optimal 
search that cannot be properly addressed by jury adjustments of the odds or probabilities for 
ultimate material facts). 
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the jury is put in the awkward position of trying to manage it by doing 
something that, ordinarily, we do not want them to do - by adjusting the 
burden of persuasion to reflect their appraisal of the evidence tamperor's quite 
distinct, litigative behavior.ss 
In response, one may well say that this modest conflation of roles can be a 
necessary expedient. After all, why is it carved in stone that the judge must 
manage the evidence search problem? Why is it that this task cannot be 
assigned to the jury, or at least shared with it, as a practical expedient in some 
contexts, risks of unfair prejudice notwithstanding? Why not, in particular, 
allow the jury to adjust the burden of persuasion to take into account evidence 
tampering by the parties?59 To answer this question, one must articulate why it 
is that, ordinarily, we assign supervision of the search problem to judges rather 
than to juries. 
58 The matter can be conceptualized in a different way. In our defective product case, 
notwithstanding the evidence of the plaintiffs destruction of the product, a juror might 
believe the probability of defect still exceeds 50% yet decide in favor of defendant on the 
grounds that (a) the evidence is too incomplete to permit a verdict and (b) the plaintiff, as 
the party having the burden of persuasion, should bear responsibility for that 
incompleteness. This presumes (contrary to the assumption in the text) that the burden of 
persuasion requires something besides a probability of defect in excess of 50%, that it has a 
second component related to completeness of the evidence. Indeed, some scholars have 
argued in favor of this idea. See, e.g., ALEx STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 80-106, 
118-33 (2005) (arguing, however, that judges should have responsibility for applying the 
completeness pmtion of the burden). That this does not work can be inferred from the fact 
that one's intuition about the result changes if it were the defendant who destroyed the 
evidence; in that case, the plaintiff still bears the burden of persuasion, but a verdict for the 
defense on account of the incompleteness of the evidence is implausible. The 
incompleteness, by itself, should be no bar to a judgment for the party bearing the burden of 
persuasion if that party cannot rightly be expected to eliminate (or have avoided) the 
evidential deficiency. Further, shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant, so that the 
jury finds (or the judge preemptively rules) for the plaintiff on account of the 
incompleteness, would be merely an ad hoc solution that only demonstrates the fact that a 
sanction is being imposed based on the parties' comparative responsibility for the 
incompleteness. And to the extent that the assignment of responsibility for the 
incompleteness is understood as a sanction, under this conceptualization the party that 
initially bears the burden of persuasion is immune from it, because responsibility for 
morally neutral incompleteness is already assigned to that party. A generalization of my 
point in regard to evidence tampering is that management of the completeness of evidence is 
properly a judicial task, part of the burden of production, not part of the burden of 
persuasion. See Dale A. Nance, Allocating the Risk of Error: Its Role in the TheOIJ' of 
Evidence Law, 13 LEGAL THEORY 129, 138-54 (2007). 
59 Cf Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of 
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 85 (2002) (discussing the ad hoc adjustment of the 
burden of persuasion in criminal cases to reflect a variety of considerations, but not 
specifically considering evidence tampering as such a consideration). 
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Obviously, supervision of discovery by a jury presents severe practical 
problems. How does one keep a jury convened throughout lengthy, pre-trial 
discovery? Similarly, how does one arrange to allow a jury to communicate its 
determinations about the adequacy of the evidence search at a time that allows 
the parties to respond meaningfully by adjusting what is presented at trial? 
Under current practice, to the extent the jury is involved in the process by its 
adverse inferences during deliberations, parties may never even know that such 
an inference has occurred, much less be able to anticipate it and respond to it. 
But there is another, even more serious problem that is easily overlooked. It 
concerns the conditions that trigger the invitation for an adverse inference. By 
way of illustration, consider a different hypothetical: a murder case in which 
the evidence presented (without regard to the adverse inference) causes the 
juror to believe that the accused's guilt has been shown beyond reasonable 
doubt. The new information that is now thrown into the mix is that there is a 
percipient witness to the crime who has not testified and who is incarcerated in 
another state for a separate crime. The defense proposes to invite an adverse 
inference against the state. Under conventional doctrine in most courts, in 
order for the juror to accept this argument, it must be the case that the witness 
not presented is peculiarly available to the party against whom the inference is 
to be drawn.60 Otherwise, once again, the party raising the argument may be 
expected simply to call the witness if the former believes that the witness 
would be helpfuL61 
It is not difficult to see the juror's problem: how is she to know whether the 
witness is reasonably accessible by the prosecution? Do states "lend" their 
inmates to other states to give testimony? What legal or political obstacles 
must be overcome to do this? And, assuming the witness is reasonably 
available to the prosecution, is the witness also reasonably available to the 
defense? What legal and factual issues affect defense access to the witness? 
Finally, what is a juror to make of the requirement that the witness be 
"peculiarly" within the power of a party for presentation? Shall we solve this 
problem by providing expert testimony that educates jurors about the litigation 
process? Surely these are the kinds of procedural matters about which the trial 
judge has a distinctly superior knowledge base, so much so that it is rather 
bizarre to think that a jury should resolve the questions of accessibility.62 
60 An example of such a jury instruction: 
If it is peculiarly within the power of either the government or the defense to produce a 
witness who could give relevant testimony on an issue in the case, failure to call that 
witness may give rise to an inference that this testimony would have been unfavorable 
to that party. No such conclusion should be drawn by you, however, with regard to a 
witness who is equally available to both parties or where the testimony of that witness 
would be merely cumulative. 
lA O'MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 17, § 14:15. 
61 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
62 Similarly complex legal and factual inquiries arise in the context of determining 
whether a witness is unavailable to the prosecution at trial so as to render the witness's 
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Furthermore, resolution of such issues quite often involves setting policy about 
what must (and must not) be done in the preparation of cases for trial, and 
setting such policy is properly a matter for the judiciary and the legislature. 
Much current practice implicitly recognizes the implications of this 
illustration. For example, in some courts, a party must seek permission from 
the court before inviting the jury to make an adverse inference, and the court is 
required to rule on many of the very issues that are then submitted to a jury.63 
And in most or all jurisdictions, the judiciary has found it necessary to develop 
a complex body of law on the question of whether to allow a pmiy to invite the 
inference.64 That is just what one would expect from the fact that the sanction 
is being used to set and enforce policy regarding trial preparation behavior. In 
any event, it would be a mistake to think that committing these evidence search 
problems to the jury avoids the proliferation of a more rigid body of law and 
allows the full flexibility of ad hoc judgment. The courts have found any such 
regime of largely ad hoc judgment to be unworkable, and rightly so. 
These points generalize to other contexts, including disputes over civil 
discovery and disputes over the destruction of evidence in both civil and 
criminal cases. In many, and perhaps most, cases, the jury is in a much worse 
position than the judge to assess the comparative accessibility of evidence by 
the plliiies as well as the motives of parties and their counsel in taking various 
actions in preparation for trial. 65 Once again, it is properly a judicial 
responsibility, in conjunction with the legislature, to set and enforce policy 
with regard to trial preparation. 
Consider, for example, the well-known case of Lewy v. Remington Anns 
Co. 66 In this case, defendant had destroyed documents related to similar 
previous complaints pursuant to a "document retention policy," and the trial 
judge had given the jury a standard form instruction: "If a party fails to 
produce evidence which is under his control and reasonably available to him 
and not reasonably available to the adverse party, then you may infer that the 
evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced it and did not."67 
On appeal of a verdict for the plaintiff, the appellate court instructed that 
adverse inference instructions should be used only after the trial court's careful 
consideration of three factors: 
First, the court should determine whether Remington's record retention 
policy is reasonable considering the facts and circumstances surrounding 
hearsay admissible; inquiries that are, of course, assigned entirely to the trial judge. See 
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 361-64 (3d ed. 2004). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 696 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1983); Simmons v. United 
States, 444 A.2d 962, 963-64 (D.C. 1982). 
64 See Stier, supra note 6, at 145-51. 
65 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Banda Chern. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 106-07 (D. 
Colo. 1996). 
69 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988). 
67 /d. at 1111. 
1108 BOSTON UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1089 
the relevant documents. . . . Second, in making this determination the 
court may also consider whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or 
related complaints have been filed, the frequency of such complaints, and 
the magnitude of the complaints .... 
Finally, the court should determine whether the document retention 
policy was instituted in bad faith. 68 
Several features of this appellate guidance are worth noting: (a) the factors to 
be considered are the kind that a court would naturally consider in deciding on 
some discovery sanction other than an adverse inference; (b) the factors are 
barely hinted at in the jury instruction itself and the appellate court does not 
suggest that these factors are to be reconsidered by the jury pursuant to some 
modified jury instruction; and (c) the factors are especially suited to judicial 
assessment, rather than jury assessment, because they relate to a party's 
behavior in litigating this and other cases. Nevertheless, once given the task, 
the jury can hardly avoid thinking along these very lines in deciding whether to 
draw such an adverse inference. The confusion of roles practically calls out 
for disentanglement, yet there is no discussion in the opinion of alternative 
sanctions or the implications of those alternatives in terms of allocating and 
protecting appropriate roles. 69 
68 ld. at 1112. 
69 Submitting the question to jurors through the medium of formal, rebuttable 
presumptions, a suggestion that courts and commentators occasionally make for civil cases, 
only makes matters worse. See, e.g., Clark Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Memphis, 229 F.R.D. 131, 
141 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (employing an indecipherable "rebuttable presumption" against the 
tamperer that does not even begin to specify the respective roles of judge and jury in 
implementing the presumption); Dor1ald H. Flanary, Jr. & Bruce M. Flowers, Spoliation of 
Evidence: Let's Have a Rule in Response, 60 DEF. CoUNS. J. 553 (1993) (advocating a 
presumption, but failing to explain either exactly how it would work or why a presumption 
is to be preferred to the more conventionally accepted inference). Again, the source of the 
problem is the difficulty, indeed incoherence, of involving juries in the administration of 
presumptions. See generally Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Cases Reconsidered, 66 
IOWA L. REv. 843 (1981) (arguing that the traditional roles of the legislature and judiciary in 
assigning the burden of persuasion and both assigning and applying the burden of 
production are obscured by the label "presumption," with the result that the jury is 
mistakenly thought to have a role in deciding facts antecedent to the burden allocation 
decision). When submitted to a jury, at least in this context, the only presumptions that 
ought to be entertained are conclusive ones, the predicate facts for which are determined by 
the court without jury involvement. See, e.g., Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1024 
(5th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the trial court, on remand, impose the sanction of "deeming" 
certain facts admitted by the tamperer); Nance, supra note 14, at 641-42, 651-52 
(advocating the use of conclusive presumptions in dealing with problems of the 
incompleteness of evidence). To be sure, the matter is entirely different if the court employs 
a rebuttable presumption in the course of its own decision-making, as when a presumption 
of prejudice arises from particularly egregious acts of evidence tampering. See GORELICK, 
MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, § 3.17. That is a presumption the jury need never and 
should never hear about. 
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Collectively, these considerations make a powerful case against the use of 
adverse inferences to deal with allegations of evidence tampering. If there is a 
problem of sub-optimality in the evidence search, a remedy should be 
fashioned by the judge, and it should not be one that calls upon the jury to 
make determinations about the accessibility of the evidence to the parties or 
about the relative blameworthiness of the parties' behavior in litigating the 
case. In essence, the problem with relying on adverse inferences to deal with 
problems of evidence tampering is that it involves judges avoiding what may 
be difficult questions by handing them over to the jury, a body with much less 
relevant experience and no proper authority to address those questions. 
It should be emphasized that the conclusions reached here do not presuppose 
any particularly skeptical view of the competency of lay jurors to perform the 
tasks properly assigned to them. This is not part of some larger anti-jury 
agendum.7° The jury is properly tasked to reconstruct the events being 
litigated; the trial judge is properly tasked, in part, to take such measures as are 
reasonable and necessary to assist and protect the jury in the performance of its 
task. The latter role entails controlling parties' attempts to game the system by 
manipulating evidence. Recognition of this responsibility connects with a 
similar principle: that evidence carrying potentiilly unfair prejudice need not 
have low probative value to be excluded if an alternative means exists, without 
any such potential, to achieve the legitimate result intended by introducing the 
evidence.71 Put in a nutshell, if "poetic justice" is to be done, it can be done, 
and should be done, by judges rather than juries. 
III. REMOVING THE JURY FROM THE EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT TASK 
If one concludes that, to the extent practicable, juries should not be involved 
in the task of setting and enforcing policy about the pre-trial behavior of parties 
in regard to evidence, then the question arises how, and with what tools, the 
court ought to pursue that task. In this Part, I will focus on the remedy of 
"issue preclusion," but also give brief attention to another evidentiary device: 
the exclusion of evidence offered by the tamperor. I will then consider the 
70 Cf NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANs, AMERlCAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 9-10 (2007) 
("If you learn anything from American Juries, it should be that, given the right environment, 
the proper tools, and the appropriate instructions, juries are reliable, fair, and accurate."). 
71 This principle is but a modest extension of the principle confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in relation to the interpretation of the trial court's authority to exclude evidence under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 authorizes exclusion of evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues, 
and the Supreme Court has made clear that, in applying this rule, the trial court is not only to 
compare the situation with and without the evidence to which objection is made, ceteris 
paribus, but also to compare the situation with such evidence to alternative presentations 
available to the proponent. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 178 (1997) 
(reversing a conviction because unnecessarily prejudicial evidence was admitted). 
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continuing role of the jury in assessing the adequacy and reliability of evidence 
that is introduced at trial. 
A. Issue Preclusion for Evidence Suppression 
In the context of evidence suppression- used here to refer collectively to the 
first three categories of tampering specified in Part I72 - consider what a judge 
can and should do by way of issue preclusion. The court considers the material 
factual issues in the case that are most directly related to the evidence 
suppression and rules summarily on those facts in favor of the non-suppressing 
party. As already mentioned, this may or may not result in summary 
judgment, dismissal, or default. If it does not, the trial proceeds with the 
surnrnmily determined facts taken as true (or false). The jury can be shielded 
from the matter entirely by removing the foreclosed facts from the list of 
ultimately decisive facts tendered for their consideration, or they may be told 
of the importance of those facts by including them in such a list, but relieved of 
the necessity of determining them by being instructed how they are to find with 
respect to those facts. Either way, the matter is relatively simple and clean. 73 
The advantages of such a procedure can be illustrated by examining an 
important Supreme Court decision. In Jaffee v. Redmond,74 the Court 
recognized the existence of a privilege in federal courts for confidential 
communications between a psychotherapist and his or her patient. The ruling 
arose in the context of an action against a police officer and her governmental 
employer for violation of constitutional rights by the use of excessive force 
resulting in death. For our purposes, the interesting aspect of this case is how 
it carne before the Court. During discovery, the trial court rejected the 
privilege claim and ordered disclosure of the interview notes of the municipal 
social worker providing psychotherapy to the defendant police officer. The 
notes were not released and the trial judge had to decide how to address this 
defiance of the court's authority. It chose to send the case to trial with a jury 
instruction advising the jury that the refusal to turn over the notes had "no legal 
justification" and that the jury was "entitled to presume that the contents of the 
notes would be unfavorable" to the defendants.75 The instruction did not 
require the jury to make such a presumption, nor did it give them any guidance 
for determining whether to do so or, if they did, for determining how 
unfavorable to the defense they should take the notes to be. The confusion 
here is manifest. As it happened, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, 
which was successfully appealed. 
72 See supra text accompanying note 10. 
73 To be sure, the matter is not quite so simple if the judge decides not to impose a 
sanction. The question then arises whether parties are to be permitted to invite the jury to do 
so. This question is taken up below. See infra Part III. C. 
74 518 U.S. !, 15 (1996). 
75 Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1351-52 n.9 (7th Cir. 1995). 
2010] ADVERSE INFERENCES ABOUT ADVERSE INFERENCES 1111 
Now consider what would have happened had the trial judge, instead of 
using an adverse inference instruction, simply entered an order that the 
defendant police officer would be deemed to have used excessive force on 
account of the refusal of discovery. There would have been no need for a trial, 
other than one to determine damages if no interlocutory appeal occurred, and 
the defendants would not have been positioned to entertain the possibility that 
the jury would engage in nullification of the trial judge's determination that 
there was no privilege. On the inevitable appeal, when the Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's ruling relating to the existence of a privilege, the case 
would have gone back to the trial comi for its first trial on liability, rather than 
its second, and indeed a trial on liability might no longer have been necessary 
at all, depending on the strength of the remaining admissible evidence. The 
efficiency gains of such an approach are obvious. Less obvious, but no less 
real, are the benefits to the jury in not ever having to consider the question of 
nullification or to speculate about the strength of the inference, if any, to be 
drawn from the defendant's epistemically ambiguous refusal to disclose the 
contents of the notes. 
Fortunately, one can find the occasional case that explains a preference for 
issue preclusion over an adverse inference. For example, in Telectron, Inc. v. 
Overhead Door Corp.,76 the trial court imposed default upon a defendant that 
willfully destroyed relevant documents.77 In the course of its opinion, the trial 
court made unusually insightful comments about the inadequacy of "lesser 
sanctions," among which was the adverse inference. The court's reasoning 
bears quotation: 
We have considered as an alternative evidentiary sanction permitting 
evidence of [Overhead Door's] obstructive conduct to be adduced at trial. 
This measure would be woefully inadequate in the context of this case, 
however, for four reasons. First, the Plaintiff here would be compelled to 
litigate its claims without the aid of possibly dispositive evidence, and the 
fact-finder would correspondingly be denied the opportunity to evaluate 
the merits of the case in light of all relevant evidence. Second, the 
sanction would leave too much to fortuity, since we can only speculate as 
to the significance which a jury might attach to evidence of willful 
document destruction in the context of a complex and protracted antitrust 
case. Third, in a case such as this, where evidence pertaining to the 
disputed document destruction is so varied and abundant, there is the very 
real risk that the destruction issue may consume the jury's attention at 
trial, diverting their focus from the underlying substantive issues.78 
76 116 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
77 !d. at 140. 
78 !d. at 136. The court's fourth reason is taken up later. See infra text accompanying 
note 126. 
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Here we observe sophistication about the proper role of the jury that is lacking 
in so many judicial opinions, such as the one in Lewy.19 True, the court's 
reference to "fortuity" in jury decision-making might be understood as a 
(largely groundless) criticism of the uncertainty of jury decision-making 
generally. Perhaps that is what the court intended. But in the context of the 
comments about distracting the jury from its proper focus on the merits of the 
case, this reference to fortuity should instead be understood to reflect the fact 
that the jury is being called upon to set and enforce policy about the pre-trial 
litigative conduct of parties, a matter about which the jury lacks the expertise 
and authority of the judiciary, and a task that the jury is not even directly 
charged to undertake. Issue preclusion avoids these complications entirely. 
There are other benefits of issue preclusion. For one, there is no need for 
litigants to explain in front of the jury pre-trial decisions about what evidence 
to search for, preserve, disclose, or present at trial: explanations that might 
necessitate revealing attorney-client communications or work product. This 
can and should be managed outside the jury's hearing.80 In addition, when 
evidence tampering is done by the attorney without the client's involvement, 
there is an important benefit to clients and to the legal system in streamlining 
the resulting malpractice litigation. If the matter of evidence tampering is 
submitted to a jury as an adverse inference, it will often be difficult, if not 
impossible, to discern whether evidence tampering, and thus malpractice, was 
found to have occurred; that determination is buried in the determination on 
the merits. By contrast, when a judicial determination of tampering becomes 
the basis of sanctions, the malpractice action should be subject to issue 
preclusion on the question of whether the attorney's actions constituted a 
breach of duty. Even if there is no formal preclusion, the explicitness of the 
judge's determination will be a clear message that will encourage settlement of 
the malpractice claim. To be sure, these are ancillary benefits. Again, the 
most important benefit of eschewing adverse inferences is that it avoids 
distracting jurors in the underlying litigation into making decisions about the 
79 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
80 Edward Imwinkelried has recently proposed that a proponent's knowing offer of 
inadmissible evidence be the basis of an explicit adverse inference supported by a jury 
instruction. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Poetic Justice in Punishing the Evidentiary 
Misdeed of Knowingly Proffering Inadmissible Evidence, 7 lNT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 
Issue l, art. 6, 2009, at 2. At this point, it should be clear why I disagree with such an 
approach and prefer that the law employ judicially managed responses to this problem. But 
in the course of his argument, Professor Imwinkelried does propose the useful idea of 
allowing the consideration of otherwise privileged information (attorney-client 
communications or work product) in preliminary hearings without effecting a waiver if and 
when the matter is then submitted to a jury. !d. at 6. This idea actually works better under 
an approach that does not submit adverse inferences to the jury at all, because then there is 
no pressure to waive these privileges at trial in an attempt to explain away the evidentiary 
misconduct. See id. at 16-20. 
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rights and wrongs of litigation, and allows them instead to concentrate on 
deciding the merits of those cases properly sub:rrlltted to them. 
A remedy that, in practical effects, often amounts to the same thing as issue 
preclusion is to exclude some or all of the evidence offered by the tamperor on 
the matter to which the lost evidence relates. 81 Such a remedy will often result 
in summary judgment against the tamperor. 82 If not coupled with an adverse 
inference, this attempt at achieving corrective justice at least eli:rrllnates the 
jury's need to assess availability of :rrllssing evidence and blameworthiness of 
the tamperor; the judge has already done that.83 In comparison to issue 
preclusion, however, it has the rather undesirable property of masking a 
solution to the evidence search problem in a determination on the merits that 
is, from an episte:rrllc point of view, arbitrarily skewed because it entails 
excluding evidence that, by hypothesis, is otherwise ad:rrllssible. 84 This is all 
the more troublesome if the exclusion does not result in summary judgment 
81 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2). 
82 See KOESELET AL., supra note 4, at 42-45. 
83 See, e.g., Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911, 914 (Nev. 1987) 
(affirming summary judgment after exclusion of evidence and noting the superiority of this 
procedure over the alternative of sending the case to trial with an adverse inference). 
84 The matter may be otherwise when a finding of tampering leads to the forfeiture of an 
otherwise valid objection, in which case the sanction is not exclusion, but rather admission 
of relevant evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (providing for the forfeiture of a 
hearsay objection when the declarant is unavailable due to the wrongdoing of the objecting 
party). This sanction may be inadequate as a response, but it need not be epistemically 
arbitrary, depending on the theory of the hearsay rule itself. If hearsay is excluded because 
jurors cannot assess the value of hearsay evidence well, the forfeiture would be 
epistemically arbitrary; the jurors' ability to handle declarations that have not been subject 
to oath and cross-examination is not improved just because a party has rendered the 
declarant unavailable. But if hearsay is excluded to discourage evidence tampering by 
encouraging parties to present hearsay declarants to testify at trial, that message is pointless 
when the opponent of the hearsay has prevented the declarant's appearance. In that case, 
the goal of frustrating the tamperer's efforts harmonizes with the goal of optimizing the 
evidence before the jury. See generally Dale A. Nance, Understanding Responses to 
Hearsay: },n Extension of the Comparative Analysis, 76 MINN. L. REv. 459 (1992). 
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and a trial is required. 85 Issue preclusion is more honest and, by reducing the 
need for trials, more efficient as well.86 
For example, in an Ohio case, Transamerica Insurance Group v. Maytag, 
Inc., 87 the trial court dismissed a complaint because of the plaintiff's 
destruction of important tangible evidence that was the subject of the litigation, 
but the appellate court reversed on the ground that dismissal was too severe. 88 
The appellate court remanded, however, with instructions that clearly 
suggested it would be appropriate to exclude the plaintiff's evidence and then 
grant summary judgment to the defendant. What was to be gained by this 
procedure is not explained in the opinion: if dismissal is too harsh, so is the 
exclusion of evidence that entails summary judgment. Even if the plaintiff 
85 See, e.g., Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., 986 F.2d 263, 265 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming 
judgment on a jury verdict for the defense after the trial court had excluded a principal 
expert witness for the plaintiff and given a jury instruction in support of adverse inference 
arguments by defense counsel). If the case goes to trial, moreover, there is the tisk that 
judicial exclusion of evidence, by thwarting jurors' expectations, may invite speculative 
inferences, not about the evidence suppressed by the party, but about the evidence 
suppressed by the judge. See Steven A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: 
Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REV. 
1011, lOll (1978). 
86 To be sure, exclusion is often invoked when a party, rather than suppressing evidence 
potentially favorable to an opponent, simply does not disclose evidence that it intends to 
offer at trial when under an obligation to do so; as a sanction, the non-disclosed evidence is 
excluded when subsequently offered at trial. See, e.g., Banks v. Hill, 978 So. 2d 663, 664 
(Miss. 2008). First, it might seem that this situation would not involve any loss of evidence 
were it not for the judicial sanction itself. This assumption, however, neglects the loss of 
counter-evidence that the opponent would be able to develop if pre-trial disclosure were 
effectuated. Second, it might seem that, in this context, exclusion of the non-disclosing 
party's evidence is the only meaningful sanction anyway, for a practice of imposing more 
serious sanctions, including issue preclusion, would simply result in the party's imposing 
exclusion on itself by not offering previously undisclosed evidence that would trigger the 
more serious sanction. This assumption, however, neglects the fact that the party will 
choose not to disclose only if there is a perceived positive chance that the non-disclosure 
will be ruled at trial not to have been a violation of its duty; if that probability is zero, then it 
does not matter whether the sanction is evidence exclusion or issue preclusion - either way 
the evidence will be disclosed and there will be no occasion to apply the sanction. If the 
probability is not zero, then issue preclusion provides a stronger incentive to disclose than 
mere exclusion of the previously non-disclosed evidence at trial. On the other hand, counsel 
might choose not to disclose under a good faith belief that the evidence will not be presented 
at trial, and issue preclusion might then be too harsh a penalty for having made an 
inaccurate prediction. The bottom line: exclusion as a sanction is less problematic in this 
context than when used as a sanction for suppression of evidence favorable to an opponent. 
87 650 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
88 !d. at 206. 
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could somehow have avoided summary judgment (and directed verdict), the 
resulting trial would likely have been farcical. 89 
Of course, it should be acknowledged- and will be discussed further below 
- that there are many other lesser sanctions that can be employed to address 
evidence suppression. The present focus on issue preclusion is driven by the 
assumption of bad faith in the conduct of the tamperor. This assumption is 
relaxed in Part IV. 
B. Issue Preclusion for Failure to Present Evidence 
With regard to the fourth category of evidence tampering, the matter is 
rather different. In the context of evidence suppression - destruction, 
manipulation, violation of a discovery order, and so forth - the act of 
suppression itself identifies the party upon whom the sanction should be 
imposed, whether that sanction be issue preclusion, an adverse inference, 
exclusion of evidence, or monetary penalties. When the problem is simply 
missing evidence - evidence that is extant and admissible but not presented at 
trial - a policy or rule is required to assign responsibility for the absence of the 
evidence, if responsibility is to be imposed at all. Unfortunately, the law of 
missing evidence inferences has been of two minds in this regard. 
On its own terms, the inference should operate against the party that is likely 
to be damaged if the evidence is brought into court; the adverse inference is 
intended to substitute, however poorly, for the missing evidence. From this 
perspective, much of the conventional law on adverse inferences is confused. 
Consider, for example, the classic formulation in a leading decision by the 
Supreme Court: "[I]f a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce 
witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he 
does not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would 
be unfavorable."90 Rather than focusing on which party has "peculiar" access 
to the evidence, a logical adverse inference in this context (in a world with a 
voucher rule· and other limiting features of the common law of evidence) 
requires only two conditions be met: (1) that the party against whom it is to be 
drawn has access to the evidence (regardless of whether the opponent does 
also); and (2) that, before one learns that the witness will not be called, the 
witness would be expected to give testimony favorable to the party against 
whom the inference is to be drawn, usually because of circumstances 
indicating bias. Case law is split on the appropriate predicates for an 
inference: some - exemplified by the Supreme Court's formulation - focus 
89 See Nance, supra note 14, at 640-43 (arguing that the exclusionary remedy makes 
sense in the context of evidence suppression only as an inducement not to suppress evidence 
and only under limited conditions, as when the excluded evidence is largely redundant or 
derivative of the information that would be provided by the evidence that has been lost). 
90 Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893). 
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entirely on the relative conditions of party access, while others focus on the 
presumptive bias of the potential witness.91 
Some courts have attempted to reconcile (or ignore) this split by merging 
the two theories into one, invoking a notion of "pragmatic availability" and 
ruling that a missing witness inference may be drawn when it is shown "either 
that the witness is physically available only to the opponent or that the witness 
has the type of relationship with the opposing party that pragmatically renders 
his testimony unavailable to the [] party (requesting the inference]."92 But the 
focus on presumptive bias is no longer justifiable, at least in a system of 
litigation with liberal rules of discovery and admissibility. That is the lesson to 
be derived from those modem cases that have rejected the use of missing 
witness inferences.93 Some other courts, while not explicitly rejecting adverse 
inferences, have now effectively limited their use to situations in which the 
proponent of the inference cannot require the witness to testify, regardless of 
the witness's relationship to the parties and thus any presumptive bias.94 
In a short but prescient article published in 1984, Joseph Livermore 
correctly concluded that in the great bulk of cases the probative value of the 
adverse inference is too weak and ambiguous to work as the inferential tool it 
is supposed to be and that, to the extent the adverse inference makes any sense, 
it makes sense only as a sanction. That is, it serves as a tool to enforce the 
presentation of missing evidence, based on the court's (or legislature's) 
judgment that such evidence ought to be presented (by someone). 95 This 
reconceptualization of what is happening when a court permits or endorses an 
adverse inference places the situation within the fourth category of evidence 
tampering detailed in Part I of this Article, in which a duty is imposed to 
91 See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 264, at 221-22. 
92 Chi. Coli. of Osteopathic Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1353-54 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (suggesting that both parties should have been allowed to argue 
an adverse inference from the failure to call a possibly disgruntled former employee of one 
of the parties). One can tell that something is seriously wrong when each party argues to the 
jury, with the judge sitting idly by, that an inference should be drawn against the other party 
in such a context. 
93 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 497, 504-06 (2007) 
(rejecting an adverse inference against the defendant for failure to call the defendant's 
employees as witnesses); Repecki v. Horne Depot USA, 942 F. Supp. 126, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996) (nominally applying New York law and rejecting an adverse inference against 
plaintiff construction contractor for failure to call plaintiffs client, an eyewitness to the 
accident); Bereano v. State Ethics Cornrn' n, 944 A.2d 538, 551-55 (Md. 2008) (rejecting an 
adverse inference against a lobbyist from the failure of the lobbyist's client to testify 
concerning the terms of the representation). 
95 Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 ARiz. L. REV. 27, 28-29,40 (1984). 
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disclose or present evidence that does not arise from a valid subpoena or 
discovery request or from the ordinary burden of production in the case.96 
From this perspective, a focus on the comparative accessibility of the 
missing evidence to the parties makes more sense. For example, if the court is 
committed to requiring that the missing evidence be presented, then, arguably, 
the burden should fall on the party with superior access to the evidence on a 
"least cost producer" theory, in order to minimize litigation costs.97 On the 
other hand, given the expansion of discovery, the elimination of the voucher 
rule, and the liberalization in the admissibility of pre-trial statements of 
witnesses, one can argue, and some courts have accepted, that there is no need 
to impose the burden on either party, except in those unusual situations in 
which missing evidence remains in the exclusive control of one side of the 
dispute or when the trial judge wants to override the joint decision of the 
parties not to present certain evidence without invoking the court's authority to 
call witnesses sua sponte.98 
Somewhat surprisingly, Professor Livermore failed to take the next step, 
that is, rejecting the use of adverse inferences even for the purpose of imposing 
and enforcing such a duty to present evidence. Taking that step involves 
recognizing that it is the responsibility of the judiciary, not the jury, to manage 
the evidence search problem, and that using adverse inferences not only injects 
risks of confusion and prejudice, but also improperly delegates much of the 
management of that task to the jury. Perhaps Livermore did not see clearly an 
alternative means of enforcement. With the benefit of the present discussion of 
discovery sanctions in suppression cases, the alternative is easier to 
contemplate. Once it is posited that the court is imposing an obligation to 
present evidence and selecting the party to bear that burden, based on whatever 
considerations of the parties' comparative access that make sense in the 
context, then the remedy for failure to produce the evidence required may 
legitimately entail issue preclusion, just as in the case of evidence suppression. 
96 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. By "ordinary burden of production" I 
refer to the idea that a burden of production is placed on a party when the evidence is not 
persuasive enough to permit a reasonable juror to decide the case in that party's favor under 
the applicable standard of proof. The burden discussed in the text is more "retail" and can 
be encountered even when the evidence would permit the jury to conclude by the standard 
of proof in the burdened party's favor. See Nance, supra note 14, at 625 (articulating the 
thesis that the burden of production should be understood as having a second component 
extending beyond the ordinary understanding related to plausible inferences). 
97 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 20, at 1963. 
98 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. Although trial judges have the 
authority to call witnesses in an adversary system, see, e.g., FED. R. Evro. 614, it is not part 
of the institutional culture to do so. See generally John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot 
Adopt the Gennan Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWAL. REV. 987 (1990). 
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Again, with that shift come simplicity and the avoidance of risks of confusion 
and prejudice.99 
Thus, if the judge in our hypothetical murder case concludes that the witness 
incarcerated in another state likely possesses useful information and can 
reasonably be produced by the prosecution but not by the defense (or, 
alternatively, can be produced by the prosecution more easily than by the 
defense), then the judge ought to order the prosecution either to call the 
witness to testify or at least to make the witness available for the defense to 
call. The court need not, and should not, be concerned with determining which 
side of the case the missing witness would be expected to support, either 
before or after learning that the prosecution does not intend to call the witness. 
If the prosecution fails to comply, then the judge should enter an appropriate 
order of issue preclusion against the government, which may well result in a 
judgment of acquittal. If, on the other hand, the prosecution complies, then 
there is no question of an adverse inference at trial. And if the judge 
determines that the witness is reasonably available (or, alternatively, equally 
available) to the defense as well as the prosecution, then neither party should 
benefit from an issue preclusion, an adverse inference against the other, or any 
other procedural sanction. In any event, the jury is not involved in the 
evidence search problem but remains focused on the final decision problem, if 
they are called upon to make a decision at all. 100 
C. Legitimate Argument About the Inadequacy of Evidence Presented 
As we have seen, if adverse inferences are to be eschewed, issue preclusion 
and other sanctions not involving the jury can be used to handle the evidence 
search problem. The judge should do what is necessary so that the jury can be 
instructed that they should assume that all evidence that can reasonably be 
presented has been, and that they need not speculate about the significance of 
any evidence they might take to be missing because of a party's misconduct in 
preparing and litigating the case. Such an instruction is not without precedent. 
Consider the critical portion of the jury instruction affirmed in Stocker: 
99 Among the benefits of simplicity is the elimination of the potential for unpleasant 
surprise that litigants can experience when they incorrectly anticipate what courts, 
sometimes appellate courts acting long after trial, will think about the question of whether 
the witness is so related to a party as to render the witness presumptively biased against, and 
thus "pragmatically" unavailable to, the opposition. See, e.g., Bereano, 944 A.2d at 554 
(reversing judgment that improperly relied on an adverse inference against a lobbyist for 
failing to call lobbyist's client, majority and dissent disagreeing over whether the client was 
"practically" unavailable to the opponent ethics commission's staff); State v. Montgomery, 
183 P.3d 267, 278 (Wash. 2008) (reversing conviction in part because trial court gave a 
missing witness instruction with respect to defendant's landlord, opining that landlord could 
not be considered peculiarly under defendant's control). 
wo The conditions of accessibility that ought to apply in civil and criminal cases will be 
explored further infra Part IV. 
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[Y]ou may take it for granted that all of the available evidence material 
and favorable to either side has been placed before you by one side or the 
other, so that you ... are as well informed and in as good a position to 
decide the case correctly as any jury could be. 1D1 
This instruction makes perfect sense provided the trial judge has taken such 
steps as are reasonable and necessary to assure that the stated conditions are 
true. 102 
But an important objection must now be addressed. If the court rejects a 
motion for sanctions based on alleged evidence tampering by a party (or no 
such motion is made), the question will arise whether the allegedly aggrieved 
party is entitled to take a "second (or alternative) bite atthe apple" by arguing 
the same issue before the jury. Ordinarily, the point of the foregoing 
arguments is that the answer must be: "No, such a claim must be made to the 
judge, not the jury." Can we live with such a result? The argument will be 
made that, when issue preclusion is denied, or some lesser sanction leaves 
factual issues to be tried, the aggrieved (non-tampering) party ought to have 
some recourse to the jury. 
In thinking about this issue, it is important to recognize what an instruction 
like the one in Stocker, and more generally a strict "no second bite" policy, 
would still allow. Most importantly, a party would still be allowed to point to 
deficiencies in the evidence supporting an opponent's theory of the case. 
Counsel would still be able to observe that a fact endorsed by the opponent is 
unsupported or poorly supported by the evidence before the court, or that the 
parties' investigation has not ruled out alternative hypotheses about the events 
being litigated. 103 What they would not be allowed to do is to identify some 
101 Stocker v. Boston & Me. R.R., 151 A. 457, 457-58 (N.H. 1930). 
102 The present thesis is limited to evidentiary misconduct in the course of litigation, 
where control by counsel and the judiciary, as well as the informational and policy-making 
asymmetry between the judge and the jury, is highest. This requires one to distinguish 
between "litigative" and "non-litigative" conduct. For example, a party's conduct during 
the commission of a crime or delict might also destroy evidence. That conduct might be the 
basis for an adverse inference. For a discussion of the problem of drawing and 
implementing the line between litigative and non-litigative conduct, see Nance, supra note 
14, at 652-58. Administering this line drawing is a cost, to be sure, but it is one that is 
incurred under present law anyway because courts must already draw the line between those 
kinds of misconduct that will result in sanctions that do not require jury assessments and 
those that result in adverse inferences implemented by juries. 
103 The issue of the exclusion of alternative hypotheses is particularly important in 
criminal cases, where it is not uncommon for the defense to argue that law enforcement 
officials did not pursue investigations that might have led to exculpatory evidence. See, 
e.g., JAMES NEFF, THE WRONG MAN 134, 136-37, 143-44 (2001) (observing that the defense 
strategy in the first trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard, for the murder of his wife, was to "attack the 
entire police investigation itself," and summarizing the cross-examination of prosecution 
experts about tests that were not conducted and theories that were not investigated, at least 
as far as the defense and the court were aware). 
i:' 
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particular potential witness or tangible tiling, known or claimed to exist or to 
have existed, and argue or suggest that significance attaches to the fact that the 
opponent has destroyed or withheld that witness or thing from the court. Such 
an argument is almost always intended to elicit the inference that the opponent 
is hiding something from the jury.t04 Nor would counsel be permitted to argue 
that the opponent should be punished for its failure to investigate thoroughly, 
insofar as punishment goes beyond merely fmding that the evidence presented 
does not support the opponent's claims. 
More subtly, jurors could still reason, and counsel could still argue, in 
hypothetical form based on the absence of certain evidence: "If proposition P 
were true, one would see evidence E; evidence E is not present, so proposition 
P must not be true." 105 In fact, telling jurors that they need not speculate that 
the absence of E in court arises from the fact that E, although once or now 
extant, has been suppressed or withheld by a party, facilitates such hypothetical 
arguments. To be sure, the judge should not allow such argument or reasoning 
if the judge determines that, unbeknownst to the jury, evidence E does exist, as 
when E has been ruled inadnlissible. Putting that possibility aside, a party who 
would benefit by a finding that Pis true would remain free to show, if it can be 
shown, that E did once exist but was, for example, destroyed before trial. In 
any event, the question of fault in the loss of E need not and should not be 
considered by the jury, and they should be told as much. It is the attempt to 
draw an inference from the suggestion of fault or strategic ploy that ought to be 
disallowed, because responsibility for dealing with that properly lies with the 
court. 106 
Consider a simple insurance dispute. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant 
insurance company has not paid on a covered loss and supports this assertion 
with plaintiff's testimony. The defendant asserts that full payment was made 
and supports this assertion with the testimony of the relevant claims adjuster. 
Plaintiff has no other evidence to show that the payment was not made. The 
defendant also offers no other evidence that payment was made. In such a 
situation, plaintiff nlight argue, and the jury could quite reasonably infer, that 
104 See United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 944 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that any 
comment by counsel that a witness was not called ordinarily involves an argument that the 
jury may infer the testimony of the witness would be adverse to the party opponent). In the 
context of Young, it was known, identified witnesses (relatives of a friend of the accused) 
whose absence the prosecutor commented on, not simply a hypothetical witness, as in: "If a 
witness to the events existed, you would expect him or her to be called; consequently, you 
may infer that there was no witness to the events." !d. at 943. 
105 I want to thank Craig Callen for emphasizing this point in conversations about my 
thesis. 
106 These abstract propositions are already a part of our practices, as illustrated (albeit 
imperfectly) by case law that considers what inferences may be argued and drawn in 
contexts where an adverse inference from tampering is disallowed. See, e.g., State v. 
Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 452 (Conn. 1999); see also infra notes 204-09 and accompanying 
text. 
2010] ADVERSE INFERENCES ABOUT ADVERSE INFERENCES 1121 
had payment been made, the insurer would very likely have kept some ldnd of 
record thereof, which would be produced at trial. This inference does not 
entail any assumption that either party has committed evidence tampering.107 
It does not require, and should not involve, any jury instruction on the 
matter.108 Of course, if light could be shed on the matter by the examination of 
the financial records of either or both parties, a court might insist on the 
presentation of such evidence by imposing a burden of production as described 
in the preceding Section.109 But if the court does not do so, the jury will 
remain free to utilize the inference described. 
Now consider a more complicated case. Suppose a rape case in which the 
accused claims that the allegation of rape is fabricated but does not claim that 
the alleged victim consented. At trial, the prosecution does not present DNA 
or other biological evidence matching the accused to traces left at the scene of 
the crime. This lack of evidence could be attributable to a number of potential 
circumstances, but for simplicity let us assume here that the following are the 
only two possibilities that are plausible in context: 
(A) such material was gathered, but it was lost by the government before 
the samples could be analyzed; or 
(B) no such biological material could be found by the police. 110 
Under the approach suggested here, aside from simply arguing that the other 
evidence in the case does not eliminate reasonable doubt, the defense in such a 
case has two options. 
(1) The defense could argue to the court that, because (A) is true, the 
prosecution's case must be dismissed (or some other sanction applied that 
does not require jury assessments) for violation of a duty with regard to 
the preparation of the case. Whether the court will accept this argument 
will depend not only upon whether the court determines that explanation 
(A) is true, 111 but also upon whether, under the applicable facts and law, 
(A) would constitute a violation of a duty sanctionable in some way. 112 -. 
107 Of course, one of the parties may have committed perjury, but as indicated above, a 
trial judge's conclusion that perjury has occurred should not be the occasion for any judicial 
sanction that interferes with the jury's opportunity to decide the merits of the case. See 
supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
108 As suggested above, defendant would be free to try to show that the want of 
documentary support for its position arises from a fire that destroyed company records. If 
the evidence for this is overwhelming, then the judge could bar argument for the adverse 
inference and even instruct the jury not to draw it. 
109 See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
110 One might argue that reasonable doubt exists whenever such forensic science 
evidence is missing, regardless of the explanation for its absence. This position, however, 
cannot be sustained. See supra note 58. 
111 To the extent that courts focus on the issue, they usually apply a "preponderance of 
the evidence" standard to such factual issues, but for the more severe sanctions, like 
dismissal and default, a "clear and convincing evidence" standard is sometimes employed. 
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(2) If the defense makes no such argument to the court or the argument 
is rejected, and the case goes to trial, the defense could argue to the jwy 
that the absence of biological material, as explained in (B), renders the 
case subject to reasonable doubt, thus warranting acquittal based on the 
hypothetical reasoning suggested above: if the rape took place, one would 
expect to find biological traces, but none were found. 113 
What the defense may not do is argue to the jury that, because the explanation 
is (A), the government should be punished for its failures or that the jury 
should infer that the evidence derived from the biological material, were it 
presented, would be favorable to the accused. 114 
Given the availability of these alternative arguments, the "no second bite" 
principle is quite defensible in most contexts. However, it is important to 
remember that assessments of the credibility of witnesses and authenticity of 
tangible evidence would continue to be the primary responsibility of the 
jury. 115 This presents what is perhaps the most difficult challenge in terms of 
removing the jury from the evidence management task. Insofar as tampering 
affects the reliability of evidence that is presented, evidence of tampering 
might be admitted, subject to the exercise of the usual judicial discretion. 
Allegations of subornation of perjury, for example, will present this problem 
See GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, § 3.23. It is not surprising that the standard 
would be adjusted based on the blameworthiness of the act of tampering alleged. See Dale 
A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 647, 670-71 
(1994). 
ll2 See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (rejecting proposition that 
the state's negligent destruction of evidence violates the due process guarantee, requiring 
governmental "bad faith" as a condition of relief). For further discussion on remedies for a 
party that loses evidence, see infra Part N.B.l. In the example above, there is a possibility 
of issue preclusion that would not result in dismissal or directed verdict: if the court finds 
that negligent destruction occurred and that such destruction is sanctionable, then the court 
might limit the sanction to an instruction that the jury should assume the test results would 
be exculpatory. See supra note 26. 
113 Of course, the government could attempt to anticipate or rebut the argument or 
inference in (2) with evidence that the biological material was collected but lost before it 
could be analyzed, or with evidence that rape could have occurred without leaving 
collectible biological material from the perpetrator. 
114 In a comparable civil case, a judge's factual determination that such evidence was 
destroyed, whether or not such destruction is sanctioned in some way, might properly be 
taken to preclude an argument as in (2), but the jury might need to be informed of the loss 
anyway in order to deflect their uninvited inferences of the same kind. 
115 When evidence tampering is the very subject of the litigation - for example, in a 
prosecution for obstruction of justice, or in a will contest involving allegations of forgery -
this point is obvious enough. What is discussed in this Section, however, is the situation in 
which testimony or tangible evidence is not the very matter being litigated, but is simply 
evidentially related to some other material issue. 
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stark1y. 116 Even if a judge fmds, for example, against the claim that a party 
purchased the testimony of a particular witness, there may still be a substantial 
probability that this was done, and the opponent arguably ought to be able to 
make such a case to the jury, so that the jury can take this possibility into 
account in giving appropriate weight to that testimony. 
Even so, courts would need to guard this point of entry carefully, lest it 
become an exception that swallows the rule. Admission would be subject to 
the exercise of the usual judicial discretion, which should be employed, for 
example, to prevent arguments that are nothing other than assertions of an 
opponent's consciousness of a weak case. 117 It is just that kind of "indefinite 
but strong" inference - to paraphrase Wigmore118 - that invites serious 
problems. And, if evidence of tampering is admitted, the jury could be 
informed of the court's ruling on the tampering motion, and be instructed that 
they may not infer adversely to the allegedly tampering party or otherwise 
attempt to punish the alleged tamperor beyond using the information to assess 
the credibility of other evidence that is admitted. 119 
The matter is especially pressing in regard to the accused's right to present 
exculpatory evidence, which bas constitutional status and may require that the 
defense be given the opportunity to present evidence of tampering by law 
enforcement officials relevant to the credibility of witnesses. 120 Nonetheless, 
116 Sometimes, discovery of the possibility of perjury will result in the withdrawal of the 
allegedly perjured testimony by the party accused of subornation. See, e.g., McQueeney v. 
Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1985) (reversing trial court's refusal 
to admit evidence of plaintiff's attempted subornation of perjury, even though plaintiff 
chose not to call the witness in question). This raises the question, which I will not attempt 
to answer here, whether the court should impose any evidentiary sanction (issue preclusion, 
adverse inference, or something else) when the moving party has suffered no prejudice. The 
trial court in McQueeney thought not, but the appellate court disagreed. Once one rejects 
the idea of allowing the jury to do "poetic justice," the answer to that question depends, at 
least in part, on whether the absence of prejudice renders sanctions purely punitive, thus 
triggering due process requirements. See Nance, supra note 14, at 639-50 (explaining that 
many remedies intended to deter evidence suppression can and ought to be understood as 
"protective" (of the court) rather than "punitive"). 
117 See FED. R. EviD. 403. 
118 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
119 A number of alternative rules can be imagined between the strictest "no second bite" 
rule and the wealcest restriction of Rule 403. For example, the proponent could be allowed 
to go to the jury with the information about tampering only when a motion for sanctions has 
been made and denied and admission is constitutionally required. Cf FED. R. Evru. 
412(b)(l)(C). Or the proponent could be allowed to go to the jury with the information 
about tampering only when a motion for sanctions has been made and denied but the judge 
nonetheless finds substantial evidence of tampering, the probative value of which with 
regard to the reliability of other evidence admitted outweighs the risks of prejudicial misuse 
described above. Cf id. 609(a)(l). 
12° Compare Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1972) (holding that the accused is 
not entitled to have a jury decide the question of voluntariness of a confession), with Crane 
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because the rationale for excluding evidence of tampering lies in its 
unfavorable balance of probative value as against the potential for prejudice 
and distraction, it is likely that even a criminal defendant will have some 
difficulty overriding the exclusion, unless the probative value of the tampering 
evidence with respect to the reliability of offered evidence is substantial. 121 
And in that case, it is likely that the trial judge will have imposed sanctions 
against the prosecution anyway. The appropriate resolution will depend, in 
part, on the standard of proof with which courts determine the matter of 
tampering on a motion for sanctions. 122 The higher that burden is set, the more 
difficult it should be to deny the defense an opportunity to argue the matter 
before the jury. Nonetheless, even in criminal cases the jury should be 
instructed not to use evidence of tampering to punish the prosecution, or to 
draw some inference about the prosecutor's confidence in the strength of the 
case, but only to assess the credibility of the evidence presented. 
IV. REASSESSING THE GROUNDS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA 
The discussion in the previous Parts has been general, drawing on examples 
from civil and criminal litigation and focusing on arguments that apply more or 
less the same in the two contexts. 123 In this Part, I address some important 
considerations arising out of the case law of these very different procedural 
systems. The main task here is to address the arguments that appear in case 
law and commentary in support of the continued use of adverse inferences. 
The reader will not be surprised at this point to learn that, in my opinion, these 
arguments are not strong enough to withstand the force of the criticisms 
developed in the previous Parts. Nevertheless, reviewing them does allow us 
to develop a more complete picture of the issues surrounding evidence 
tampering. 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-91 (1986) (holding that the defense is entitled to present to 
the jury evidence concerning the voluntariness and thus reliability of a confession even 
though the trial court has held the confession to have been voluntary and therefore 
admissible). It is worth noting, however, that the Court in Crane emphasized that "neither 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in its opinion, nor respondent in its argument to this Court, 
has advanced any rational justification for the wholesale exclusion of this body of 
potentially exculpatory evidence." Jd. at 691. On a case-by-case basis, such a rationale will 
not be difficult to find. 
121 See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 (2006) (reversing the 
exclusion of evidence offered by the accused when based on the assumption that the 
prosecution's evidence is strong, but confirming that evidence offered by the accused may 
be excluded in an appropriate exercise of Rule 403). See generally EDWARD J. 
lMWINKELRIED & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE chs. 2, 8, 9 (3d ed. 
2004). 
l22 See supra note 111. 
123 The examples used so far have avoided evidence tampering by the accused in 
criminal cases, however, because this clearly must be treated separately. 
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A. Adverse Inferences in Civil Cases 
I begin with civil cases, where the use of adverse inferences remains very 
common. Because the issues are somewhat distinct, the discussion once again 
is divided between the context of evidence suppression and that of failure to 
present evidence. 
1. Evidence Suppression: Unconvincing Reasons to Invoke the Adverse 
Inference 
In cases that discuss the matter at all, the most consistently recurring 
rationale for preferring an adverse inference to issue preclusion in the context 
of evidence suppression is that there is a need for sanctions that are less severe 
than default or dismissal. 124 The obvious idea here, though rarely elaborated, 
is that instructing a jury that they may infer a proposition to be true is less 
severe than instructing them that they must take that proposition as true or 
simply granting dismissal, default, or summary judgment. But this argument 
poses several serious difficulties. 
First, there is the question of whether an adverse inference really is less 
severe than issue preclusion. In theory, if a juror accepts that the conditions 
warranting an adverse inference are present, she might nonetheless adjust the 
probability of a material fact, but not by enough to change her verdict 
preference. As suggested above, however, this probably misconceives the 
decision that the juror will often make. She is not likely to be interested in the 
probability of the material fact, but only the probability and blameworthiness 
of the act of evidence tampering. If the evidence about these matters is strong 
enough that a judge would be willing to order issue preclusion were the 
adverse inference sanction off the table, then it is unlikely the juror will see the 
matter differently. If she does, it is likely to be because she has not understood 
the problem of access to evidence as well as the judge, which means that her 
response, while potentially less (or more) severe, is inappropriately so. 
Second, to the extent my behavioral hypothesis is wrong, and jurors are able 
and willing to make rational adjustments to the probability of material facts 
without confounding, prejudicial inferences, there remains the normative 
question: why should a court choose a less severe sanction than issue 
preclusion? After all, if a party acts in bad faith to suppress evidence, what 
reason is there to impose a less severe sanction than one that, in the great 
majority of cases, will put the tamperor in no worse position than he would 
have been in had he not suppressed the evidence? A Holmesian "bad man" 
will discount the pain of the remedy by the probability of being detected; if the 
tamperor estimates the probability of being detected as smaller than the 
probability that his case would be lost if the evidence were not suppressed, 
124 See, e.g., ABC Home Health Servs., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 158 F.R.D. 180, 183 (S.D. 
Ga. 1994); Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 552-54 (D. Minn. 1989); Trevino v. 
Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 952, 955-61 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting the "spoliation tort" and 
canvassing the alternatives). See generally KoESEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 32-48. 
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then tampering may become "rational" in a nal.Towly instrumental sense of that 
term, even with issue preclusion as the remedy. The temptation to think in this 
way is all the greater if a less severe sanction is employed such that the 
tarnperor might not lose even upon detection. 125 This is the fourth reason 
given in the Telectron case for rejecting the use of an adverse inference: 
Fourth and finally, merely allowing the destruction issue to be explored at 
trial is unlikely to serve as an effective detel.Tent against similar 
wrongdoing in the future. If the putative destroyer of discoverable 
documents were ever to believe that his actions, at worst, would only 
result in the presentation before a jury of evidence surrounding the 
obstruction, you might well conclude that an unfavorable inference as to 
document destruction would be less detrimental than allowing certain 
evidence to be presented at trial. We have observed that a key purpose of 
Rule 37 sanctions must be "to insure the integrity of the discovery 
process." A sanction which invites the unscrupulous litigant to embark 
upon such a cynical calculus cannot be seen as meeting this· 
requirement. 126 
Consequently, the principal reason articulated in the opinions for the need to 
have recourse to a less severe sanction than dismissal or default is the 
variability in the blameworthiness of the tamperor. 127 Certainly, evidence 
tampering occurs on a continuum of scienter or fault. But how, exactly, should 
that matter? Negligent destruction of evidence might well call for a less severe 
sanction than issue preclusion, but using adverse inferences for this purpose is 
particularly inapt. The inference that the party is hiding something fails when 
the party acts without the intention to do so, a point long recognized in cases 
125 See Charles Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for 
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 793, 795 (1991). The same point shows 
why it is a mistake to think that, in the context of bad faith tampering, it is enough to take 
steps that will eliminate the prejudice to the disadvantaged party, for example, by 
compensating that party for the costs involved in reconstructing the content of destroyed 
documents. See, e.g., Capellupo, 126 F.R.D. at 552-54 (contemplating adverse inferences in 
addition to an order to pay reconstruction costs, as well as double the litigation costs 
associated with obtaining relief from the bad faith evidence tampering). 
126 Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 136 (S.D. Fla. 1987) 
(citation omitted). 
127 See authorities cited supra note 124. Another reason offered is the variability in the 
extent of prejudice the opponent suffers. But issue preclusion and other remedies, like 
monetary sanctions, obviously can be adjusted appropriately to deal with this. To the extent 
that issue preclusion is narrowly tailored, applying only to some intermediate fact, see supra 
note 26, it might be less severe than an adverse inference, given the latter's potential for 
unfair prejudice affecting the tamperor' s entire case. Issue preclusion's capacity for 
precision, while retaining the flexibility for partial summary judgment, default or dismissal, 
must count as a decided advantage. 
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and commentary. 128 Thus, using adverse inferences to provide a less severe 
sanction for negligent destruction entails accepting something like my 
psychological assumption that what the juror is really doing is modifying the 
burden of persuasion as a penalty for the party's negligence. Unless we are 
prepared to accept the legitimacy of such action and re-craft our jury 
instructions to reflect this special role, one must look elsewhere for a "less 
severe" sanction in the context of negligent destruction. 129 Fortunately, 
options are not difficult to find. For example, there is the option of imposing a 
monetary sanction payable to the disadvantaged party, which does not require 
any jury involvement.I30 
This point is reinforced by examining those opinions that do allow adverse 
inferences in the context of negligent destruction of evidence. Here, many 
courts, in effect, acknowledge that the inference does not rest on the accepted 
logic, because the evidence of tampering does not rationally influence the 
juror's assessment of the probability of a material fact. As one treatise on the 
128 John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation 
or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 231-35 (1935); see also 2 McCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 265, at 228. One might argue that a party's negligent failure to 
preserve evidence suggests that the evidence was not favorable to that party; otherwise, the 
party would be inclined to take greater care to preserve it. See GORELICK, MARZEN & 
SOLUM, supra note 4, § 2.8. But at best, this only places the lost evidence within a class that 
includes both evidence favorable to the opponent and (the presumably much larger subclass 
of) evidence helpful to neither party. The inference from negligence to a loss of evidence 
helpful to the opponent typically is, therefore, a decidedly wealc and ambiguous one. 
129 Imagine what such an instruction would have to look like: 
You are instructed that, if you find that a party has negligently destroyed evidence 
relevant to this case, you may take this into account in deciding how strong the other 
evidence presented in the case must be in order to support a verdict for the party 
bearing the burden of proof. 
This hardly seems like a solution that will be widely adopted, if only because of the 
potential for confusion, "double counting" if the judge has imposed other sanctions 
unknown to the jury, and the possibility that the jury will override the judge's determination 
that the destruction was merely negligent. This is not to say that an adjustment of the 
burden of persuasion ought never to be allowed, even implicitly. For further discussion of 
the point, see Nance, supra note 14, at 658-59, which gives qualified endorsement to the 
idea that the jury could consider bad faith or negligent destruction of evidence occurring 
outside the context of litigation in applying flexible standards of proof. 
130 See, e.g., Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 77-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(imposing monetary sanctions to redress negligent destruction of evidence). There is also 
the less useful option of relegating the disadvantaged opponent to an expensive and time-
consuming separate action in tort. Compare Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for 
Unce11ainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1895-96 
(1997) (advocating tort liability for damaging evidence), with Friedman, supra note 20, at 
1979-80 (arguing that remedies intrinsic to the litigation of the primary claim are more 
efficient than a distinct cause of action in tort, at least when the destruction is caused by a 
party to the litigation). The acceptance of a distinct spoliation tort varies considerably 
among jurisdictions. See generally GORELICK, MARZEN & SoLUM, supra note 4, ch. 4. 
1128 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1089 
matter observes, these courts reason, nonetheless, that "the need to deter and 
punish spoliation is a sufficient basis for giving the instruction." 131 But what is 
the source of the contemplated deterrence and punishment, if it is not to be 
found in the jury's rational adjustments of the probability of materials facts? 
All that is left is adjustment to the burden of persuasion (or pretextual 
adjustments to the probability of the material facts that are, in truth, simply a 
substitute for the former).l32 
Courts sometimes confuse the deterrent and protective functions of 
sanctions with the almost invariably ephemeral goal of eliminating the 
unlmowable evidential damage resulting from negligent destruction of 
evidence. For example, a court may speak of "restoring the evidential 
balance" caused by the loss of evidence, without explaining what "evidential 
balance" means or how permitting a jury to irrationally infer adversely to the 
tamperor serves such a purpose, except by serendipity. 133 Some commentators 
have suggested that the adverse inference is an attempt to do corrective justice 
that does not serve to facilitate the accurate determination of facts, but rather to 
define the conditions under which a fair judgment is rendered. 134 This 
argument serves to separate the procedure of allowing an inference from the 
question of whether the inference is appropriate as a tool for improving 
accuracy. This may be a way to characterize those decisions that allow 
adverse inferences in the context of negligent destruction, but it begs the 
question of why such a procedure should be chosen when there are ample 
alternatives that do not contemplate increasing the risk of inaccurate fact-
finding and that do not rely on the jury to assess whether the pre-trial evidence-
handling techniques were negligent. To be sure, this inclination to extend the 
adverse inference to negligent destruction is certainly understandable, for the 
131 See KOESEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 37. 
132 A few courts have accepted the argument that the destruction of an (otherwise 
valuable) instrumentality of harm is relevant to show that the instrumentality was defective 
or dangerous when destroyed (else why would something of economic value be destroyed?). 
See, e.g., Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d 150, 156 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). This basis 
for an inference is actually unrelated to fault in regard to the evidential character of the thing 
destroyed, and though possibly viable in some cases, it poses serious questions under the 
rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures. Cf. Rodriguez v. Webb, 680 
A.2d 604, 606-07 (N.H. 1996) (rejecting the use of an adverse inference in the absence of 
fraudulent intent, but affirming the use of an adverse inference where the jury could 
reasonably have believed that the destruction was fraudulent). Importantly, the court in 
Rodriguez also observed that the defendant, who claimed to have destroyed the 
instrumentality in order to avoid future injury, did not raise an issue under Rule 407 of the 
New Hampshire Rules of Evidence. !d. 
133 Tumer, 142 F.R.D. at 74-76 (analogizing an adverse inference to the exclusion of the 
tamperor's evidence). As already noted, the exclusionary remedy suffers from the same 
kind of problem. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. 
134 See, e.g., GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, §§ 2.3, 2.8 (distinguishing 
between factual truth and "courtroom truth"). 
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harm to the integrity of the adjudicative system often warrants some kind of 
response -just not this one. 
To summarize, as a gross generalization about an enormously varied body 
of case law, courts today tend to reserve issue preclusion to the most serious 
cases - cases of very bad faith - and employ adverse inferences in less serious 
cases that still involve bad faith, intentional and knowing tampering, 135 and, for 
some courts, even negligence. This response is too weak in many serious 
cases, rests upon assumptions about legitimate inferences that are false in 
other, less serious cases, and ultimately conflates the roles of judge and jury in 
all cases employing adverse inferences. In contrast, my suggestion would 
extend issue preclusion to all cases of bad faith and, quite plausibly, to many 
cases of gross negligence as well. 136 To be sure, a gradation of punishment is 
still possible, because other sanctions can be added in particularly egregious 
cases. For example, issue preclusion can be extended from one issue, that to 
which the lost evidence relates, to the entire case, resulting in dismissal or 
default. 137 Alternatively, monetary sanctions can be imposed separately from, 
and thus in addition to, issue preclusion. 138 
Of course, there may be other reasons for choosing an adverse inference as 
the remedy besides the quest for a proportionately severe sanction. The only 
one that has any real plausibility is that, at least in some contexts, a court might 
feel limited by procedural rules that remove issue preclusion from the arsenal 
of responses. For example, there is some dispute about whether issue 
preclusion and the other remedies permitted by Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are available if the irreversible destruction of evidence 
occurs before a valid court order to enforce discovery has issued, especially 
when the destruction occurs before the litigation is initiated. Many courts have 
135 Some courts differentiate between bad faith destruction of evidence and intentional 
and knowing destruction, although the distinction remains murky. See, e.g., Nation-Wide 
Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 217 (1st Cir. 1982) (affinning an 
adverse inference from "purposeful" acts in "knowing disregard" of the plaintiff's claims). 
See generally GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, § 3.11. 
136 Precedent exists for the remedy of issue preclusion, and even a resulting dismissal or 
default, based on negligent destruction of a key piece of evidence. See, e.g., Thiele v. 
Oddy's Auto & Marine, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 158, 161-63 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 
137 See FED. R. Clv. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see also, e.g., Am. Cash Card Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
184 F.R.D. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Other illustrative cases are discussed in KOESEL ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 45-47. 
138 See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 488-90 (S.D. Fla. 1984) 
(imposing default judgment and assessing attorney's fees and costs against the defendant for 
the destruction of documents). In imposing sanctions, a court must be careful not to be 
sufficiently punitive as to trigger the due process protections associated with criminal trials. 
See, e.g., Bush Ranch, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 1524, 1557-58 
(M.D. Ga. 1995) (imposing, in a civil trial, unconditional monetary sanctions payable to the 
court), rev'd, 99 F.3d 363, 368-69 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the due process protections 
of a criminal trial would b.e required in a civil suit for such a sanction to be imposed). 
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held that they are available even under such circumstances, pursuant to either 
the court's inherent authority or a discovery order entered after the act of 
destruction, but other courts have been operating on a contrary assumption. 139 
The former is the better-reasoned view.l40 In any event, to the extent that this 
problem of judicial authority is the explanation for a perceived need to take 
recourse in adverse inferences, the situation calls for clarification or change in 
the procedural rules rather than recourse to a remedy that is so poorly suited to 
the task. 
2. The Missing-but-Available Evidence Problem Revisited 
Although there are signs of increasing judicial skepticism, most courts 
continue to allow adverse inferences in civil cases based on a party's failure to 
present an available witness or tangible evidence. A panel of the Fifth Circuit 
has proposed in dicta the rejection of missing witness inferences in federal 
civil trials, 141 and at least some lower courts in that circuit seem to be 
following that lead. 142 So far, however, no other appellate court has moved so 
boldly, at least in civil cases, perhaps because of a sense. that some response is 
necessary in those unusual cases where, despite liberal discovery, only one 
party has access to the evidence that is rnissing. 143 
One oft-cited commentator, Robert Stier, who is harshly critical of 
prevailing doctrine allowing adverse inferences from the failure to present 
available evidence, nonetheless argues for the retention of such inferences, 
albeit in a much weakened form. 144 Stier's arguments for retaining adverse 
inferences, while more substantial than what one finds in judicial opinions, are 
ultimately unconvincing. 
139 See Sanchirico, supra note 11, at 1262-66, 1272-73. 
140 See GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, §§ 3.4-6. 
141 See Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 911 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990). At least 
one state legislature has moved in this direction. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-216c (1998) 
(abolishing missing witness instructions in civil cases, but permitting arguments by counsel 
that would invite such inferences). 
142 See, e.g., Parks v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., No. 1:04CV240, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
75723, at *6-*7 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 16, 2006). The matter continues to be controversial, 
however, even in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Streber v. Comm'r, 138 F.3d 216, 218, 221-22, 
227 (5th Cir. 1998) (ignoring Herbert but still rejecting, over a dissent, an adverse inference 
from the failure of the taxpayer to call the attorney in a case involving an advice-of-counsel 
claim). 
143 Courts have also expressed reservations, if not always carefully thought through, 
about litigation that is not conducted under the liberal rules of discovery and admissibility 
that characterize ordinary civil litigation in the federal courts. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 
262 F.3d 336, 366 n.10 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (arguing for an adverse 
inference against a criminal defendant for his failure to testify in a state habeas proceeding 
under review in a federal habeas proceeding). 
144 See Stier, supra note 6, at 157-59, 166-75. 
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First, he argues that the inference generally passes the test of relevance even 
when the missing evidence is available to both sides. 145 That may be true, but 
the reason for rejecting the inference is not that a party's failure to present the 
evidence is irrelevant. Rather, it is that the probative value of the omission is 
almost always too weak and ambiguous in comparison to its potential for 
prejudicial inferences and its distracting invitation for the jury to undertake an 
evidence management task that is rightly assigned to the judiciary. Once 
again, the better legal response to the omission is to allow the opponent to 
present the evidence.146 
Stier's second argument is a policy argument, namely, that complete 
elimination of the adverse inference would create. incentives for wasteful 
discovery practices because a party would then find it necessary to depose 
presumably hostile witnesses in order to determine whether they possess 
helpful information. 147 This argument seems quite implausible. The party will 
want to depose such presumably hostile but apparently knowledgeable 
witnesses in order to nail down their testimony, both to avoid surprise at trial 
and to facilitate settlement by better gauging the relative strength of the 
parties' cases. Indeed, one would question the judgment of an attorney who 
did not do so, whether or not adverse inferences are permitted. 
145 What Stier actually claims is that, given that the inference is appropriate under 
conventional doctrine in the majority of courts only when (a) the opponent has exclusive 
access to the evidence and (b) the evidence would be supposed to "naturally" favor the 
opponent (say, because of bias), see id. at 145-48, the fact that modern civil discovery 
essentially negates the first condition does not negate the second condition, and that 
satisfying the second condition is sufficient under the conventional rationale. ld. at 157-58. 
Of course, since the stated conditions are conjoint, satisfying the second but not the first 
condition does not sustain the inference on the conventional rationale. Perhaps, however, 
Stier meant to assert that the conditions are (or should be) disjoint, that satisfying either 
condition is sufficient to warrant an adverse inference, as a matter of policy if not legal 
doctrine. In any event, I have interpreted Stier to be arguing that the inference is logically 
relevant even though both parties have access to the missing evidence, provided that the 
inference is invited as to a party who would be naturally favored by the missing evidence. 
146 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. One could also interpret the relevant 
passage in Stier's article as arguing that adverse inferences are sufficiently probative so as to 
be worth the risks of prejudice and confusion. But Stier makes no real case for this, and it is 
generally inconsistent with his critique of prevailing practices. More importantly, Stier does 
not contemplate any alternative means of regulating the missing evidence problem, such as 
the use of issue preclusion advocated here, so he seems to be arguing only that adverse 
inferences are better than nothing. In fact, however, his proposal amounts to nothing, in this 
sense, because he proposes such a mild adverse inference instruction that, according to Stier, 
it amounts to telling the jury "that all the relevant and useful information is before the jury." 
Stier, supra note 6, at 171. That is not unlike what is proposed here, except that I endorse, 
in appropriate cases, the use of sanctions like issue preclusion in place of adverse inferences 
in order to make sure that such an instruction to the jury tells them something that is likely 
to be true. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
147 Stier, supra note 6, at 158. 
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Finally, Stier argues that rejecting the inference when both sides have access 
to the evidence would generate controversies over the availability of the 
evidence that would need to be resolved by the judge and, ultimately, the jury, 
and that resolving these controversies is an unnecessary cost. 148 The problem 
with this argument is that no version of the conditions under which an adverse 
inference is to be allowed, including the one favored by Stier, avoids this 
problem; not surprisingly, all presuppose that the party against whom the 
inference is invited must have reasonable access to the evidence in question. 149 
The important point here is this: if determinations of availability must be made, 
they should be made by the judge, who has superior knowledge and experience 
to assess this particular question; the accuracy of such assessment is improved 
and the costs of such assessment are reduced if the issue is not repeated in front 
of the jury. 
As discussed above, the law on adverse inferences from missing but 
available evidence is deeply conflicted. 15° The suggestion here is that the law 
should be purified - removing its focus on anticipating which way the 
evidence would cut if it were presented, but retaining its focus on enforcing a 
requirement, when appropriate, that the evidence be presented to speak for 
itself. That done, the trial judge would need to address two questions when 
such an issue arises. First, is it important that the particular missing evidence 
be presented to the jury? When both parties have access to it, usually the 
answer will be "No," and having access requires nothing more than being 
physically and legally able to put the evidence before the jury, unless the 
financial cost of doing so is disproportionate to the nature of the 
controversy. 151 (An exceptional case would occur when the judge believes the 
evidence might well be important to the jury yet neither party has an incentive 
to produce it. 152) On the other hand, when access is truly unilateral, despite the 
availability of liberal discovery devices, then the presumption ought to be in 
favor of requiring presentation unless a satisfactory explanation is given by the 
party with control of the evidence for neither presenting it nor making it 
available to the opponent.I53 
148 !d. at 158-59. 
149 !d. at 147-48, 170. 
150 See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. 
151 See Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 911 F.2d 1044, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990); see also 
cases cited supra note 94. 
152 See MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADR!Ff 98-101 (1997) (arguing that 
adversarial presentation of evidence underutilizes "neutral" information that does not clearly 
favor one side or the other). 
153 Cf United States v. Funds Held in Name or for Benefit of Wetterer, 17 F. Supp. 2d 
161, 185-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting an adverse inference against the holders of certain 
accounts for their failure to call the beneficiary thereof; accepting as an excuse for non-
appearance the fact that the beneficiary was a resident of Guatemala who feared being 
arrested upon entry into the United States to testify), rev'd on other grounds, 210 F.3d 96 
(2d Cir. 2000). 
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Having decided to require presentation, the second question must be 
addressed: upon which party should the burden of presenting the evidence fall? 
In civil cases, the court should impose a burden to produce missing but 
important evidence, evidence that the court has decided the jury should 
consider, upon the party that can obtain and present the evidence with the least 
cost. There is no reason to favor one party over the other in this respect, and 
using a "least cost producer" standard serves to keep to a minimum the cost of 
obtaining the missing evidence. Of course, in the presumably unusual civil 
case when the missing evidence is within the exclusive control of one party, 
then the burden should fall upon that party. Conversely, in the case where the 
court cannot discern a difference in the acquisition costs of plaintiff and 
defendant - which may not be that unusual in practice - it is appropriate to 
default to imposing the burden of production on the party bearing the burden of 
persuasion on the issue.l54 
In any event, if the court chooses to impose no burden of production on 
either party as to the witness in question - and this should be the most common 
resolution of the issue - adverse inferences should be precluded. On the other 
hand, if a burden of production is imposed, but the missing evidence is not 
presented, issue preclusion ordinarily should follow. Either way, the jury is 
not asked to resolve the matter. 
B. Adverse Inferences in Criminal Cases 
The problems inherent in the use of adverse inferences are present in 
criminal cases as well. Fortunately, current practice in criminal cases diverges 
less from the present proposal. The analysis varies, because of the obvious 
asymmetry between prosecution and defense. 
1. Evidence Tampering by the Prosecution 
When it is discovered that prosecutors or other law enforcement officials 
have violated due process guarantees by failing to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, the remedy of choice is compelled disclosure or, if trial has already 
resulted in a conviction, retrial with the missing evidence made available to the 
accused.155 One can, of course, question whether these remedies provide 
adequate deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct, and whether issue preclusion 
ought to be taken more seriously as a remedy in cases of flagrant violation, but 
at least the standard remedies do not require the jury to struggle with 
determining whether the prosecution has violated appropriate litigational 
norms nor with how to adjust the probability of guilt or the measure of the 
burden of persuasion as a consequence of such a violation. Similarly, when the 
prosecution has destroyed material evidence in violation of federal or state 
constitutional requirements, the courts tend to impose dismissal or the 
154 See Nance, supra note 14, at 643. 
155 See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1984) (distinguishing reversible 
from irreversible tampering). 
I !!' 
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exclusion of related prosecution evidence, at least when they take any remedial 
action at all. 156 For the reasons articulated above, the better practice is to 
impose issue preclusion, and some courts do in fact specify that procedure. 157 
Even in situations involving violations of non-constitutional disclosure or 
preservation requirements, adverse inferences are not preferred. 158 When the 
problem can be rectified before trial by disclosure, or even during trial by 
continuance, to do so is the obvious judicial preference. Otherwise, more 
common than the use of an adverse inference is the exclusion of prosecution 
evidence directly relating to the non-disclosure. 159 As already noted, skewing 
the evidence in favor of the accused in this way has the virtue of not involving 
the jury directly in assessing the prosecutorial misconduct, but it has the 
disadvantage of depriving the jury of what is, by hypothesis, useful evidence, 
thus introducing unnecessary arbitrariness into the verdict. 160 
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions employ adverse inferences as a remedy for 
violations of the state's constitutional or non-constitutional duties to preserve 
evidence, especially when the state's action cannot be characterized as 
involving "bad faith." 161 This practice suffers from all the same problems that 
appear in civil cases and should be curtailed. To be sure, the inferences 
sometimes have a mandatory character unlike the traditional form: jurors (or 
other fact-finders) may be told to assume that the lost evidence would have 
156 !d. at 486-91; see also 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, § 24.3(e) & nn.l29-36, at 386-
88 (noting, however, that in some cases of negligent or accidental destruction constituting a 
violation of state law, courts have employed adverse inferences). 
157 See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 174 F.3d 584, 589 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the proper remedy for the government's intentional or negligent destruction of tape 
recordings must be dismissal of the indictment "because a new trial cannot remedy the 
government's nondisclosure," that is, even if an adverse inference were allowed at retrial); 
United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928,931-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the appropriate 
remedy in a bad faith destruction case was dismissal of the indictment and specifically 
rejecting the prosecution's proposal to submit the matter to the jury with instructions to 
assume the truth of certain defense claims). 
158 See generally GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, supra note 4, ch. 6. Marzen and Solum 
suggest that this reluctance to employ adverse inferences may arise from the unwillingness 
of judges to tell jurors of the "disturbing possibility" that law enforcement officials might be 
framing innocent defendants. !d. § 6.3, at 209. 
159 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, § 20.6(b). 
160 See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text. 
161 See, e.g., State v. Serna, 787 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Ariz. 1990); State v. Hartsfield, 681 
N.W.2d 626, 630 (Iowa 2004); Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Ky. 2002); 
see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that one reason to reject the defendant's due process claim, based on negligent 
destruction of evidence by the state, was that the trial court had given a permissive adverse 
inference instruction to the jury that returned a conviction). 
-
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been favorable to the accused.162 This removes the necessity for the jury to 
assess the conditions triggering the adverse inference; that decision has been 
made by the judiciary, and properly so. However, there is still the problem of 
how much to adjust the probabilities involved: just how favorable is 
"favorable"? To the extent that my psychological hypothesis is correct, there 
will be little left for the jury to do, and the result is very nearly the same as the 
issue preclusion recommended here, with one conspicuous exception. The 
prosecution may hope for jury nullification of litigation norms that the 
instruction is intended to reinforce. As with adverse inferences, the jurors 
might be tempted to ignore the procedural impropriety and to convict someone 
they believe to be guilty. Although understandable from the point of view of 
the jury, that possibility hardly seems to be an advantage of the practice, if we 
really care about the litigation norms in question, and issue preclusion would 
tend to minimize the risk of nullification. 
In contrast, adverse inferences against the prosecution have been fairly 
common in the modem era when the prosecution has failed to call a witness or 
present evidence available to the prosecution, the existence of which has 
become known to the accused. 163 As already noted, the discernible recent 
trend is to reject such inferences, but the cases manifesting that trend 
invariably involve evidence that is reasonably available to both parties, and the 
implication is that there is no problem of lost information that the adversarial 
response cannot solve. 164 This, however, will not always be the case. 
Situations can arise in which the prosecution has exclusive or substantially 
superior access to missing evidence. Once again, when a remedy is required, 
issue preclusion should be preferred to adverse inferences. Moreover, unlike 
civil cases, the immunity from the production burden that the accused should 
enjoy makes it inappropriate to invoke a "least cost producer" theory to avoid 
imposing a burden on the prosecution when the missing evidence is available 
to both sides; a burden should fall on the accused (in the form of an adverse 
inference, rather than issue preclusion) only when the accused has exclusive 
access to the missing evidence, unless the missing evidence relates to a true 
affirmative defense, as discussed more fully below. 
162 See, e.g., Thome v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331-32 (Alaska 1989) 
(mandating a conclusive presumption as the remedy for a state's destruction of a videotape 
in violation of the state constitution, which does not require a showing of bad faith). But see 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Ky. 1994) (rejecting defendant's 
proposed conclusive presumption in favor of permissive adverse inference). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926-28 (7th Cir. 1976) (approving 
the use of an adverse inference from the government's failure to call an arresting officer as a 
witness); United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 502-03 (lOth Cir. 1975) (approving the 
use of an adverse inference from the government's failure either to present surveillance 
photographs or to explain their non-presentation). 
164 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. 
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A good illustration concerns the absence of testimony by an informer, when 
any governmental claim of privilege is rejected. 165 Some cases follow the 
present recommendation, putting the prosecution to a choice between 
presenting the informant at trial (or at least making the informant available for 
the defense to call) or accepting issue preclusion (and potentially dismissal). 166 
Admirably, such cases do not contemplate the possibility of the trial 
proceeding to verdict using an adverse inference against the government, and 
occasional decisions make clear that such inferences will not suffice. 167 On the 
other hand, cases utilizing an adverse inference do occur. 168 A perusal of cases 
raising the issue of an adverse inference finds that the courts are utilizing a 
variety of entirely plausible factors in deciding whether to impose a sanction or 
remedy for the prosecution's failure to produce the informant; the problem is 
not so much with the factors being considered or even how they are weighed, 
as it is with the remedy being applied.I69 
Another important illustration concerns use immunity. A potential witness 
exercising the privilege against self-incrimination can be compelled to testify 
by grant of immunity. Functionally, this makes such a witness available to the 
government but not the defense, because of the government's control over the 
granting of immunity. 170 Many jurisdictions nonetheless preclude the defense 
from invoking an adverse inference, treating the government's discretion as if 
it were a true and weighty privilege, one that can be exercised without review 
by the courts or negative consequences for the government, despite its 
inte1ference with truth-finding. 171 The premise is deeply problematic. 
Rejecting it, some courts have responded to the unfairness and truth-defeating 
165 Once again, the question of drawing inferences from the exercise of valid privileges is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. See supra note 37. 
166 See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (holding against the 
government's claim of privilege for an informer's identity and observing that, in the absence 
of a valid privilege, the prosecution must choose between disclosing the informer's identity 
and dismissing the prosecution); United States v. Tornabene, 687 F.2d 312, 315-16 (9th Cir. 
1982) (reversing a conviction because of the government's failure to take reasonable efforts 
to produce an informant whose presence had been requested by the defense). 
167 See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202, 2Il (7th Cir. 1977) (reversing a 
conviction despite the trial court's employment of an adverse inference against the 
government for failure to produce the informant). 
168 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 413 N.Y.S.2d 571, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that the 
state had a duty in the particular case to present an informant, breach of which should be 
remedied by a jury instruction permitting the jury to infer that the informant's testimony 
"would not support" the evidence adduced by the state). 
169 See generally Allen Stephens, Annotation, Adverse Presumption or Inference Based 
on State's Failure to Produce or Examine Informant in Criminal Prosecution -Modem 
Cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 547 (1990). 
170 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 805 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992). 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 158-59 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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potential of this regime by expanding the ability of the defense to insist on the 
immunization of its witnesses; when the request is granted, the government 
must comply or else dismiss the prosecution, or so much of it as might be 
affected by the lost witness's testimony. 172 This is the right direction for the 
law to take. 
Unfortunately, the conditions some of these courts have placed upon the 
defense being able to obtain such relief are unhecessarily onerous, and the 
relief does not extend to all situations in which the witness plausibly might 
provide exculpatory testimony. Most problematically, some courts require a 
showing by the defense that "the government has engaged in discriminatory 
use of immunity to gain a tactical advantage or, through its own overreaching, 
has forced the witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment." 173 Without going into 
a detailed analysis here, suffice it to say that this requirement has proved a very 
high hurdle for the defense to surmount. 174 As a consequence, these courts are 
faced with the question of whether to allow an adverse inference against the 
prosecution in contexts in which the defense request for immunity is denied. 
There is indication that this is possible when the government has failed to 
immunize a witness who would be likely to give exculpatory testimony. 175 
This is an understandable but unhappy development. The gap should be 
closed: courts should either grant use immunity (and this should be more 
liberally allowed) or else deny the defense any remedy. In any event, the jury 
should not be placed in the position of having to review the considerations that 
go into deciding about the availability of the witness to the prosecution and to 
the defense, and to speculate about the likely impact of such testimony were it 
to be given. 176 
Finally, it should be reiterated that, even if my suggestions are implemented, 
when the accused is unable to obtain relief from the trial judge on account of 
alleged prosecutorial evidence tampering, the accused retains the option of 
attacking the adequacy of the evidence that is presented to the jury, whether by 
motion for directed verdict of acquittal or by argument to the jury. 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887, 889-92 (9th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Bums, 684 F.2d 1066, 1077 (2d Cir. 1982); Gov't of V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
173 Bums, 684 F.2d at 1077. 
174 See Reid H. Weingarten & Brian M. Heberlig, The Defense Witness Immunity 
Doctrine: The Time Has Come to Give It Strength to Address Prosecutorial Overreaching, 
43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1189, 1192 (2006). 
175 See Myerson, 18 F.3d at 160 (rejecting an adverse inference where exculpatory 
testimony was unlikely, but stating that "in the absence of circumstances that indicate the 
government has failed to immunize an exculpatory witness, a district court does not abuse 
its discretion by refusing to give a missing witness charge"). 
176 Cf. Weingarten & Heberlig, supra note 174, at 1199-201 (arguing that, under the 
present regime, the use of adverse inferences is necessary, but acknowledging that it is a 
decidedly unhappy situation because of the difficulties faced by the jury in deciding whether 
and how to draw such an inference). 
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Furthermore, when the prosecution's evidence tampering affects the reliability 
of evidence that is presented, the accused has a weighty interest, supported by 
constitutional norms, in being able to attack the prosecution's case before the 
jury, provided that the defense does not argue merely for a consciousness of a 
weak case on the part of the prosecutor or law enforcement officers. 177 These 
qualifications speak to those situations in which the accused claims to have 
been intentionally framed or to have been adversely affected by shoddy police 
work. If the defense plausibly asserts that the state is out to frame him, it may 
be of little solace, to the accused or the public, to be told that the jury need not 
consider the matter because a judge has found the claim to be without merit. 
But the jury's role can and ought to be limited to assessing the strength of the 
evidence against the accused, carefully avoiding the imposition of punishment 
on the state or governmental officials for their alleged evidential misconduct. 
If the officials are to be punished, that ought not to take the form of a jury's 
acquitting a guilty defendant. 
2. Evidence Tampering by the Defense 
When it is found that the defense engaged in evidence tampering, once again 
current practice depends heavily upon whether the tampering is effectively 
reversed. If so, trial is allowed to proceed, perhaps with an adverse inference; 
if not, then either exclusion of defense evidence or an adverse inference against 
the accused tends to be the norm. 178 Because of the constitutional limitations 
noted earlier, 179 adverse inferences must be preferred to issue preclusion in this 
context. 180 That is not to say, however, that the rules regarding such inferences 
cannot be improved, and courts obviously should be cautious in allowing or 
encouraging these inferences. 1St 
177 These distinctions have been articulated in a previous section of this Article. See 
supra Part III. C. 
178 Numerous cases exemplifying the use of adverse inferences can be found in the 
standard treatises. See, e.g., 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, §§ 264, 265; lA 
O'MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, supra note 17, § 14:13 (providing form instruction authorizing 
adverse inference against the accused for failure to obey court order to provide handwriting 
exemplar or perform other acts relevant to identification). 
179 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
180 Because of the double jeopardy prohibition, the option of retrial may be unavailable 
when the defendant's tampering is not discovered until after an acquittal, and the option of 
excluding defense evidence may run afoul of the accused's right to present a defense, 
especially if it is applied outside the context of failures by the defense to make required 
disclosures of anticipated defense witnesses. See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, § 20.6(c). 
181 Just as the independent spoliation tort is typically an inadequate remedy for a civil 
party's evidence tampering, criminal prosecution for obstruction of justice and related 
crimes committed by someone accused of another crime, though sometimes theoretically 
available, is usually a less than satisfactory remedy. See GORELICK, MARZEN & SOLUM, 
supra note 4, § 5.1. On the other hand, before permitting an adverse inference, the trial 
judge ought to consider the viability of the alternative remedy of invoking a sentence 
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There is a special problem with inviting inferences based on the failure of 
the accused to present available evidence. The accepted constitutional 
principle is that the accused is under no obligation to present evidence at all, 
except as to genuine affirmative defenses. 182 Some courts seem to have taken 
this to imply that no adverse inference can ever be drawn against the accused 
for failure to present extant evidence, except again in the possible context of 
true affirmative defenses. 183 To be sure, these decisions generally also rely on 
some of the non-constitutional arguments against adverse inferences 
adumbrated here, and it is difficult to discern how important the constitutional 
argument is to the result. Moreover, some suggest that the constitutional 
dimension arises only from jury instructions encouraging an adverse inference, 
not from the jury's inference itself or even from prosecutors' comments that 
invite such an inference.184 Finally, just because the accused has no legal duty 
to present a witness or other evidence - which certainly forecloses issue 
preclusion as a sanction for breach of duty - does not mean that an inference 
cannot be drawn from the accused's failure to present such evidence; 
legitimate choices may have embarrassing evidential consequences, at least 
when the choice falls outside the ambit of a recognized privilege. 185 On the 
other hand, the privilege against self-incrimination is a doctrine in flux and 
may yet become a broad privilege of the accused not to be pressured, even 
unintentionally, by the use of an adverse inference to produce evidence that 
might be self-incriminating.IB6 
enhancement under provisions like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 273 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (claiming that the Court 
would have found no constitutional infirmity arising from a judicial finding of obstruction 
of justice as part of the sentence enhancement otherwise ruled unconstitutional in the case). 
182 See, e.g., COMM. ON FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE- SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 3.24, at 52-53 (1999) 
(discouraging the use of missing witness instructions in general and endorsing, for those 
unusual circumstances where one is appropriate, an instruction that reminds jurors that "the 
law does not impose on a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any 
witnesses or producing any evidence"); COMM. ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
FIRST CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 2.11, at 31-32 (1998). 
183 See State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 (Me. 1985); State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 
200 (Minn. 1974); Ross v. State, 803 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (Nev. 1990); State v. Jefferson, 
353 A.2d 190, 199 (R.I. 1976). 
184 See State v. Tahair, 772 A.2d 1079, 1086-87 (Vt. 2001); Russell v. Commonwealth, 
223 S.E.2d 877, 879 (Va. 1976). 
185 See, e.g., State v. Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 451 (Conn. 1999) (disallowing adverse 
inferences relying principally on non-constitutional arguments and adding constitutional 
concerns as a matter of "policy," but rejecting the constitutional argument as such). 
186 Compare Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612 n.4 (1965) (barring comment on the 
accused's failure to testify), with United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 42 (2000) (barring 
use of subpoena duces tecum directed at the accused to conduct "fishing expedition" to fmd 
inculpatory evidence), and id. at 49-56 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring) (proposing to 
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Putting aside the possibility of such constitutional developments, the 
laudable modem trend to deny "missing witness" inferences, when the witness 
in question is not the accused, derives from non-constitutional considerations 
that apply only in contexts in which the witness is available to the prosecution 
and the adversarial response is therefore adequate to deal with the problem. To 
be sure, the mere fact that the potential witness is related to the accused or 
otherwise might be expected to favor the defense should not render the witness 
unavailable to the prosecution and thus warrant an adverse inference against 
the accused. 187 To think it should is to fall back into the mistaken framework 
of trying to anticipate which side will be favored by the contemplated 
testimony. Iss On the other hand, one can easily imagine cases in which the 
prosecution can show that (a) an important witness to the events being litigated 
exists (or at least is claimed by the defense to exist), (b) the prosecution has 
exhausted its efforts to identify and locate this witriess, and (c) the accused 
knows the identity or whereabouts of the wimess but has not divulged such 
information. !89 An adverse inference should be allowed in such a case if the 
surrounding circumstances do not suggest a good reason, compatible with 
innocence, for not revealing the whereabouts of the witness. 190 
extend the privilege to protecting against the compelled production not just of incriminating 
testimony by the accused, but rather of any incriminating evidence). 
187 Some cases have begun to respect this principle. See criminal cases cited supra note 
21. But there are still many that do not. See Allen Stephens, Annotation, Adverse 
Presumption or Inference Based on Party's Failure to Produce or Examine Family Member 
Other than Spouse- Modem Cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 337, §§ 3-14, at 347-73 (1990); Allen 
Stephens, Annotation, Adverse Presumption or Inference Based on Party's Failure to 
Produce or Examine Friend- Modem Cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 779, §§ 3-6, at 788-821 (1990). 
188 See supra notes 90-100 and-accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., State v. Hillstrom, 150 P. 935, 939 (Utah 1915) (holding that the evidence 
was sufficient to support a conviction for murder in connection with a robbery, emphasizing 
that the defendant's only explanation of his gunshot wound referred to a controversy with an 
unnamed man over an unnamed woman). A more complicated example involves rules 
preventing a witness from testifying against his or her spouse in a criminal trial. Whether an 
adverse inference should be allowed in such a context may depend on whether the 
jurisdiction considers this a privilege rule (as opposed to a rule of competency) and whether 
it accepts the rule that no comment is allowed on the valid exercise of a privilege. Compare 
State v. Spears, 300 P.2d 551, 561-62 (Wyo. 1956) (holding that it is legitimate for a 
prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to call his wife because the wife was a 
competent witness on behalf of her husband but an incompetent witness on behalf of the 
state), with Commonwealth v. Moore, 309 A.2d 569, 570-71 (Pa. 1973) (holding that the 
purpose of a spousal incompetency rule would be defeated if a missing witness inference 
were allowed). 
190 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (authorizing the court to exclude relevant evidence the 
probative value of which is substantially outweighed by the risk of misleading the jury or 
wasting time). Based on the risks of prejudice and confusion, one might plausibly take the 
stronger position that adverse inferences should never be allowed against the accused as to 
missing but extant evidence available to be called. See, e.g., Livermore, supra note 95, at 
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These points are nicely illustrated by a Maryland case. In Robinson v. 
State, 191 the defendant, tried for theft of an automobile, testified that someone 
else had given him permission to use the car.192 Before trial, and initially at 
trial, the defendant identified the alleged bailor simply as a friend named Alvin 
but would not provide his last name or his location. 193 Defendant explained his 
refusal to more fully identify the bailor by stating that he lived in an 
environment where one might be shot for identifying a friend as a criminal 
perpetrator. 194 The prosecution understandably requested, and the trial court 
gave, a missing witness instruction, stating that the jury could find that because 
the defendant failed to produce the witness, the witness's testimony would 
have been unfavorable to the defendant. 195 The Maryland Court of Appeals 
affirmed the ensuing conviction, rejecting the argument made by the defense 
that the witness, if called, would have claimed his privilege not to testify .196 
The court opined that, in the conditions of the case, such an exercise of 
privilege would in no way harm the defendant's case because it would suggest 
that the witness was the one who had stolen the automobile. A dissenting 
opinion disagreed on the ground that the jury might instead infer, for example, 
that the two men had been confederates in crime.I97 
To this point in the analysis, the court employed the correct framework, 
regardless of who (as between majority and dissent) was right on the question 
of prejudice to the defendant. But one fact is troubling. At trial, the defendant 
was threatened with contempt, at which point he reversed course, naming his 
friend as one Alvin Johnson and indicating that he knew Alvin well and, in 
particular, knew where Alvin worked. 198 This raised the question of why the 
police did not use this new information to locate Alvin and determine whether 
the defendant's account was corroborated. That in tum suggests that an 
adverse inference was inappropriate because Alvin was available to be called 
by the prosecution if his potential testimony contradicted the defendant's 
testimony. 199 This issue was abandoned on appeal to the high court, having 
33. But if we are to allow such inferences in the context of evidence destruction by the 
accused, it is difficult to see how a distinction can be drawn between evidence that is 
destroyed and evidence that is exclusively available to, but withheld by, the defense. 
191 554 A.2d 395 (Md. 1989). 
192 Jd. at 397. 
193 ld. 
194 ld. 
195 ld. at 396. 
196 ld. at 397-401. 
197 Jd. at 401-04 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
198 Jd. at 397, 400 (majority opinion). 
199 Nominally, the court employed a version of the adverse inference rule that bars its use 
if the witness is "equally available" to both sides. ld. at 397. One might infer from this that 
if the witness is more readily available to the defense than the prosecution, an adverse 
inference could be used. But that is not the way one should interpret "equally available" in 
this context: equal availability defeats the use of the inference, but easier availability to the 
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been resolved at the intermediate court of appeals on the ground that 
"defendant possessed exclusive knowledge concerning the witness and his 
whereabouts up to the moment he testified at triaL"200 Presumably, the 
significance of this fact lies in the belief that the prosecution could not have 
pursued such an investigation at that late date, with the trial already well 
underway. If that belief is accurate, then the witness was never reasonably 
available to the prosecution, at least for that trial. This problem must be a 
common enough occurrence because the defense is rarely, if ever, required to 
disclose in advance of trial the identity of potential witnesses that the defense 
does not intend to cali.2°1 Unfortunately, reported cases do not discuss the 
important question of whether the prosecution can gain access to the witness 
during trial in time to present the witness in rebuttaL There is much to be said 
in favor of Professor Livermore's view that, "[i]f the prosecutor's frustration is 
to be assuaged, it can be done by a short continuance so that he can find those 
who might corroborate and offer them if he finds doing so advantageous. "202 
Finally, whenever an adverse inference against the accused is held 
impermissible, whether under conventional practice or the suggestions made 
here, the question arises what kinds of comments may be made about the 
absence of evidence. The problem is essentially the same as discussed above 
in connection with a regime in which the alternative to an inference might be 
another possible sanction.2D3 
In a generally thorough and insightful opinion, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut tried to articulate the relevant distinctions as applied to 
prosecutorial arguments, but it did not get them quite right.204 The court 
disapproved missing-witness adverse inferences against the accused in 
criminal cases, relying primarily on the capacity of the prosecution to call 
defense does not warrant its use. In the circumstances of Robinson, either the witness was 
reasonably available to the defense or he was not (we cannot be sure). If he was not, no 
adverse inference should be allowed; if he was reasonably available to the defense, then he 
was also reasonably available to the prosecution (i.e., "equally available"), and for that 
reason the adverse inference should not be allowed. This is unlike civil cases, where the 
sanction (whether an adverse inference, issue preclusion, or something else) arguably should 
be placed on the "least cost producer." Things might be different if the witness's testimony 
relates solely to an affirmative defense, upon which the defense bears a burden of 
production as well as the burden of persuasion. Cf State v. Parker, 417 N.W.2d 643, 647 
(Minn. 1988) (distinguishing prosecution's case from affumative defenses and suggesting 
that an adverse inference is permissible with regard to the latter). 
200 Robinson, 554 A. 2d at 401 n. 8. 
201 See 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 8, § 20.5(e); see also People v. Macana, 639 N.E.2d 
13, 16 (N.Y. 1994) (affirming adverse inference against the defendant for failure to produce 
his father as a witness, when defendant first testified at trial that the weapon involved 
belonged to, and was used by, his father). 
202 See Livermore, supra note 95, at 33. 
203 See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text. 
204 State v. Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 452 (Conn. 1999). 
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witnesses whose testimony would be adverse to the accused.205 The court 
noted, however, that the prosecution should be allowed to point to gaps or 
weaknesses in the evidence supporting defense claims.206 Specifically, the 
court opined that the prosecutor should be allowed to note the weakness of 
testimony corroborating the defendant's alibi, so long as the prosecutor does 
not suggest that responsibility for this deficiency in the evidence lies in a 
strategic choice by the defense.2o7 
So far, so good. But the Connecticut court also would allow the prosecutor 
to point to the absence of a named individual claimed in defense testimony to 
have been present at a time that would permit that individual to corroborate the 
alibi.208 This is a mistake. There would be no point to make that additional 
argument other than to suggest that failure to call the named individual was 
due to the awareness by the defense that she would not corroborate the alibi. 
And this, if believed by the prosecution, should result in the prosecution 
calling the witness or requesting the court to do so, as the court had already 
acknowledged.209 The court's confusion is further indicated by its dicta that 
comment on the absence of the witness would be inappropriate when the 
potentially corroborating witness was unavailable to be called.210 This 
mistakenly slides back into the conventional framework that the court had 
properly rejected: the availability of the witness matters if one is trying to draw 
205 The language of the opm10n makes clear that the same prohibition applies to 
invitations by the defense to draw adverse inferences against the state. Id. 
206 ld. 
207 ld. This case is unlike Robinson in that there is good reason to believe that the 
prosecution could have gained access to the missing alibi witness before trial. As in federal 
cases, Connecticut requires the defense to give advance notice of alibi witnesses whom the 
defense intends to call. CoNN. R. SUP. COURT § 40-21 (2010). While the defense did call 
alibi witnesses, the missing witness issue arose because there was another person present at 
the time and place of the alibi, a person who could corroborate or deny the accused's alibi 
but was not called by the defense. Malave, 737 A.2d at 445. Presumably, however, the 
police could have contacted the alibi witnesses disclosed in advance by the defense, or 
persons otherwise known to the prosecution, and gained access through them to the other 
potential alibi witness that was not called by the defense. There is no discussion of the 
matter in the opinion. 
208 Malave, 737 A.2d at 452. 
209 The court tries to explain away this conflict in the following terms: 
It may be true, of course, that the implicit point of such argument would be to attempt 
to persuade the jury to infer that the witness, if produced, likely would have provided 
testimony adverse to the opposing party .... We nevertheless believe that, for criminal 
cases, it is the sounder policy for counsel, whether the prosecutor or defense counsel, to 
avoid explicit reference to such an inference. 
ld. at 452 n.l6 (emphasis added). But it is hardly adequate to say that the prosecutor can 
make comments that are intended to invite the adverse inference and that in fact cause the 
jury to draw such an inference so long as neither the judge nor the prosecutor explicitly 
invites the jury to do so. 
210 I d. at 452. 
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an adverse inference from failure to call her; in contrast, the unavailability of 
the potential witness does nothing to cure the weakness in the defendant's 
evidence supporting the claimed alibi. Whether she was available or not, the 
defense had only weak evidence supporting the alibi, or so the argument would 
go, and that is all that the prosecution should be allowed to argue.2ll 
In summary, the unavailability of issue preclusion against the accused, at 
least with respect to elements of the prosecution's case-in-chief, means that 
adverse inferences, for all their difficulties, must continue to be permitted. But 
appropriate caution in the employment of such inferences entails restricting 
them to cases of evidence suppression by the accused (categories (1)-(3) of 
evidence tampering212) and to the withholding of evidence in the exclusive 
control of the accused. In all such contexts, the difficulties of adverse 
inferences in terms of ambiguities of inference and potential prejudice require 
an unusually restrictive application of judicial discretion.213 
CONCLUSION: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING AHEAD 
In a leading case from 1846, two years before New York's progressive 
adoption of the Field Code, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
use of an adverse inference against a private claimant in a forfeiture 
proceeding involving allegedly false statements made by the claimant to 
reduce the amount of his import taxes.214 It seems the government was unable 
to obtain the original, or admissible copies, of important documents in the 
possession of the claimant that would provide evidence of the true value of the 
211 The careful reader might wonder why this is not a situation in which the prosecution 
should be allowed to use the hypothetical argument described earlier: if proposition P were 
true, one would see evidence E; evidence E is not present, so proposition P must not be true. 
See supra text accompanying note 105. The problem with using this argument in this 
context is that one must be precise about what constitutes the proposition, P, and the 
expected evidence, E. In this context, the argument would have to be this: if the unnamed 
individual's potential testimony would support defendant's alibi (P), then one would expect 
the defense to present her corroborating testimony (E). But in light of the availability of the 
potential witnesses to the prosecution, the same argument can be made against the state: if 
the unnamed individual's potential testimony would disconfirm the defendant's alibi (P), 
then one would expect the prosecution to present her disconfirrning testimony (E). In other 
words, the absence of corroborating or disconfirrning testimony from the named individual 
is hopelessly ambiguous, suggesting that the individual may not have been in a position 
either to confirm or to disconfirm the alibi. 
212 See supra Part I. 
213 It might well be advisable to incorporate a "reverse 403" standard that would make 
the use of adverse inferences against the accused impermissible unless the probative value 
thereof, in context, outweighs (or substantially outweighs) the risks of prejudice to the 
accused or misleading the jury. Cf FED. R. Evm. 609(a)(l) (requiring that, for certain 
criminal convictions to be admitted to impeach the accused, their probative value must 
outweigh the risk of prejudice). 
214 Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 247 (1846). 
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imported goods. So instead, the government served notice upon the claimant 
to produce the documents at t:J.ial. When the claimant failed to produce the 
documents, the government argued an adverse inference against the claimant, 
which was supported by a jury instruction.215 The Supreme Court affirmed this 
procedure, invoking the general principle that "the best evidence of disputed 
facts must be produced of which the nature of the case will admit," and 
concluding that, even where the force of that principle does not require 
exclusion of "secondary" evidence in favor of "primary evidence" (as in the 
case of the hearsay rule or the rule requiring the original of a document), the 
force of the principle supports a presumption against the non-producer of 
evidence in his possession that is "stronger" than that which he presents at 
t:J.ial.216 
Such a procedure made sense in a system of litigation with limited 
discovery, and thus limited discovery sanctions; one that perceived the t:J.ial 
judge's role as largely limited to that of referee. In the present era, with 
substantially increased judicial oversight of the preparation of cases for t:J.ial, 
and the development of powerful discovery sanctions, the practice is less 
coherent with institutional arrangements. It is not surprising that courts and 
commentators in the modem era have leveled strong criticisms at the practice. 
It has become something of a procedural anachronism. Yet the inertia of past 
practices has combined with what some may regard as a reluctance on the part 
of trial courts to shoulder the task of supervising litigative misconduct to 
permit the survival of the adverse inference.217 It is time to press the insight 
that some courts have attained and to curtail the use of adverse inferences. 
This does nothing to belittle the principle that the Supreme Court affirmed in 
1846. Rather, it refines its application by adjusting it to the context of new 
institutional realities. 
There remains the question of how the elimination of adverse inferences as a 
remedy for evidence tampering, except in the narrow categories I have 
indicated, would be received by the judiciary, especially t:J.ial judges. That is, 
215 The exact reason for recourse to an adverse inference is unclear. On the one hand, the 
common law was "a system which gave no general right to require production, even at trial, 
of documents in the possession of the opposite party." MILLAR, supra note 5, at 219. On 
the other hand, there was a procedure for discovery through a separate bill in equity. That 
procedure, however, was cumbersome and full of restrictions, which led to various rriodest 
statutory reforms during the early nineteenth century. /d. at 221-23. Even at the time of 
Clifton, the federal courts benefitted from a statute allowing parties to demand production of 
documents at trial and even specifying dismissal or default as the penalty for non-
c~mpliance, but it was premised on satisfying the same onerous conditions required for pre-
tnal discovery by way of a bill in equity. See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 536 (1911). 
216 Clifton, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 247-48. On this "best evidence" principle, see generally 
Nance, supra note 13. 
217 See, e.g., Herbert v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 911 F.2d 1044, 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 1990) 
~.calling the missing witness rule an "anachronism" that has been applied by federal courts 
reflexively"). 
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suppose that a legislature or the highest appellate court in a jurisdiction were to 
endorse my position.218 How would trial judges react? Since my proposal 
would eliminate adverse inferences in most contexts, the question is what trial 
judges would do in those cases where, under the current regime, they would 
allow or encourage an adverse inference. Would such judges then shift to 
using other sanctions for evidence tampering, or would they simply ignore 
claims of tampering altogether? If the former, would they shift to sanctions 
weaker than adverse inferences, or would they be willing to impose issue 
preclusion in accordance with my recommendation? 
If trial judges were to react by simply giving a pass to evidence tampering, 
then the loss of deterrence might well be more important than the benefits of 
simplifying the jury's task and improving the rationality and accuracy of 
particular verdicts. But if trial judges were to react by invoking substantial 
alternative sanctions in those cases where, under the current regime, they 
would be inclined to use adverse inferences, then the calculus of social benefit 
tends to tip in the other direction. One should hope to see an increased use of 
issue preclusion, and it would be important, in the course of eliminating the 
adverse inference, to emphasize the advantages of that alternative sanction. 
One interesting device for doing so would be for the court or legislature to 
specify that previous precedents endorsing or applying an adverse inference for 
evidence suppression, except those involving inferences against the accused, 
should be taken henceforth as persuasive authority for the use of issue 
preclusion in comparable cases.219 This would tend to dissuade trial courts 
from withdrawing from the management of evidence tampering. 
Even if restriction on the use of adverse inferences is not achieved by 
comprehensive legislation or broadly stated common-law rule-making, one can 
at least contemplate that the arguments presented here will encourage courts to 
continue and even accelerate the trend away from using such inferences to 
control evidence tampering by parties. If coupled with an increased use of 
issue preclusion or other serious sanctions for evidence tampering, our trials 
would then be much cleaner, if somewhat less frequent. Neither consequence 
is to be feared. Indeed, the legal profession owes no less to the citizens who 
serve on the nation's juries. 
218 Illustrative judicial innovation has been noted already. See supra note 21. There is 
also precedent for broad legislative restrictions on the use of adverse inferences. See, e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216c (West 2005) (abolishing missing witness instructions in 
civil cases). 
219 This approach will not work for problems of a failure to present evidence because of 
the continuing tendency of courts to overuse of the adverse inference in that context. As we 
have seen, in many cases where an adverse inference is currently allowed, no remedy or 
response is appropriate at all, other than allowing the opponent to present the missing 
evidence. 
